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Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: A Challenge to the Appointments Clause and
its Ramifications to Corporate Governance
Todd B. Skelton*
In the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which established the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) to protect investors in publicly traded
companies and to promote fair, independent audits of such companies based upon
auditing standards promulgated by the PCAOB. The PCAOB, whose members
are appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), exercises
investigatory and disciplinary powers in overseeing public company audits. My
study examines (1) the pending United States Supreme Court case, Free
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, in which petitioners allege that vesting the
appointment of the PCAOB in the SEC rather than in the President violates the
U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause by effectively removing the President’s
control over an independent agency and (2) the significant effects that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in the case will have on public companies and auditing
firms by either confirming the PCAOB’s investigatory and enforcement powers or
invalidating a significant accounting and corporate governance reform.
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I.

Introduction
Independent agencies have become a well-known and integral part of the governmental

framework in the United States. This “Fourth Branch” has become increasingly popular in the
seventy years that have passed since the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), as evidenced by the growth in the number and
authority of administrative agencies during and since the New Deal Era. The government-byadministrative-agency model has been further supplemented by industry self-regulation, as seen
in the accounting industry. The Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB case that is examined in this
paper presents a constitutional challenge to this schema. Many scholars have written about the
U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause, regulation by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) and independent agencies. This paper extends that scholarship
by laying out the regulatory framework prior to and following the enactment by Congress of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, analyzes the constitutional implications of the Free Enterprise
Fund case, and identifies and explores several issues that may potentially arise from the Court’s
decision in the case.1
II.

Background
This section will explore the creation of the regulatory framework for public companies

and the accounting profession in use by the United States today. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”) is the independent agency charged with protecting
investors and regulating the securities market in the United States.2 Its roots trace back to the
1

There is a growing body of literature about the PCAOB. E.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Presidential Control of the
Elite “Non-Agency,” 88 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2010); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The
PCAOB and its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005); Michael A. Thomason, Jr., Auditing the
PCAOB: A Test to the Accountability of the Uniquely Structured Regulator of Accountants, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1952
(2009). This article examines the Free Enterprise Fund case now pending before the United States Supreme Court
and the potential implications of the Court’s decision in the case.
2
Securities and Exchange Commission, What We Do, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml

4
New Deal Era. The history of the Securities and Exchange Commission and auditing standards
will be laid out to preface the current regulatory environment. Accounting scandals, such as
those at Enron and WorldCom, precipitated the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“SOX”),3 which has reformed corporate governance and accounting. Additionally, SOX created
the PCAOB (or “Board”), which changed the regulatory environment for the auditors of public
companies.
A.

The Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC is a disclosure-enforcing agency.4 The SEC has broad jurisdiction and is

charged with interpreting and enforcing the securities laws of the United States.5 The federal
securities laws and some related laws include: the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”),6 the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,7 the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,8 the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939,9 Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as added by the Chandler Act
of 1938,10 the Investment Company Act of 1940,11 the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,12 the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,13 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,14 all as amended.

3

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 561 (rev. ed. 1995); see SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD
ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 27 (1981). “Full disclosure is based on a theory that investors will
make more informed investment decisions if management is forced to disclose all ‘material’ information about its
company.” JERRY M. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO
REFORM 143 (2006).
5
The securities laws listed here are federal statutes. The United States is unique in that corporate law is primarily a
state function. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW (2 ed.) (2004).
6
15 U.S.C. § 77.
7
15 U.S.C. § 78.
8
15 U.S.C. § 79.
9
15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (publicly traded debt securities are issued only under an SEC-approved trust indenture with an
appointed trustee).
10
52 Stat. 883 (1938) (SEC acts as an advisor to the courts or party in a bankruptcy proceeding); see Joseph L.
Weiner, Special Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at United Federal Workers of America: Functions of the
SEC Under the Chandler Act (Nov. 30, 1938).
11
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1-80a-52.
12
15 U.S.C. § 80b (in conjunction with Investment Company Act, supra, these two acts cover the registration and
disclosure of investment companies and advisers and regulate these entities).
13
15 U.S.C. § 78aaa.
4
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Generally, the 1933 and 1934 statutes require registration for any security that can be sold to the
public and mandate corporate disclosure. These responsibilities are only a fraction of the
mandate the SEC fulfills today.
1.

The Creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission

Before the Great Depression, Wall Street was self-regulating. As the American legal
historian Lawrence Friedman has noted,
The New York Stock Exchange ran its own (private) system of securities
regulation. Any company that wanted to list stock on the exchange had to file
financial information, and provide [an] independent legal opinion, about the
company and its securities. But companies could get around these requirements
by registering stock on some other exchange. The New York Stock Exchange
itself never had enough staff to double-check the information; many companies
engaged in creative bookkeeping and accounting—which the stock exchange was
powerless to detect.15
Subsequent to the 1929 stock market crash,16 the United States government became
interested in the regulation of Wall Street. Much of the initial focus under the Hoover
administration centered on short-selling and curbing speculation.17 Ferdinand Pecora, counsel to
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, however, spearheaded an investigation in 19331934 into the nation’s financial institutions. In this investigation, hearings focusing on the
National City Bank garnered much public attention. Bank executives had incorporated National
City Company in 1911 to skirt existing banking restrictions aimed at dividing traditional
commercial bank practices from riskier investment banking practices.18 As a result of the Pecora
investigation, public opinion toward bankers plummeted,19 and newly inaugurated President

14

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 164 (2002).
16
For a discussion of the 1929 crash, see JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (50th anniv. ed., 1979)
(1954).
17
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 3, 5.
18
Id. at 23-24. For an account of the Pecora hearings, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT:
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 434-439 (1959).
19
See id. at 29.
15
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Franklin D. Roosevelt furthered the rancorous attitude against financial institutions.20 After
expanding the Banking Committee’s authority in its financial practices hearings,21 Pecora
brought J.P. Morgan and Company under scrutiny. This relentless investigation was the basis for
the passage of the Banking Act of 1933, 22 and the Pecora hearings, as a whole, influenced the
passage of the 1933 Act.23 There was, however, much more to the creation and passage of the
1933 Act.
Prior to the passage of the final version of the 1933 Act, two versions had existed. The
first, proposed by Samuel Untermyer at the request of Raymond Moley,24 would have vested in
the Postmaster General the authority to regulate stock exchanges, securities, and financial
statements.25 President Roosevelt, among others, was reluctant to have the Post Office
Department oversee stock exchanges and accounting and created another team to draft a
securities reform bill.26 This new, second bill, drafted largely by Huston Thompson, a former

20

See The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 2, p. 12, available at
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ppotpus&cc=ppotpus&type=bib&q1=roosevelt%
2C+franklin&rgn1=author&Submit=Search.
21
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1933, at 1.
22
Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933); see SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 38.
23
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
24
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 51. Moley, an Assistant Secretary of State and former Barnard College professor at
Columbia University, was an important, “[e]ssentially . . . conservative” member of Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust” who
later broke with FDR and became an opponent of New Deal reform. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE
LION AND THE FOX 153 (1956); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 59, 107,
201 (1990); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932–1940 at 32 (1963).
Untermyer has been described as a “crotchety” lawyer who was “notable for his struggles on behalf of insurance
company stockholders and against J. P. Morgan and the trusts.” JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT: FDR’S
HUNDRED DAYS AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE 278 (2006); FREIDEL, FDR, supra, at 19.
25
R. MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 177 (1939).
26
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 52. The unorthodox administrative practice of giving his assistants overlapping
assignments of the same task was a favorite of Roosevelt’s. See ALTER, supra note 24, at 278; BURNS, supra note
24, at 371-374; FREIDEL, supra, note 24, at 84, 120-121; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 328; SCHLESINGER,
supra note 18, at 535 (new agencies created with jurisdictions that overlapped each other and spilled into cabinet
departments). At the agency level, fierce internal conflicts occasionally resulted from the President’s delegation of
power “so loosely that bureaucrats found themselves entangled in lines of authority and stepping on one another’s
toes,” but, as the historian James MacGregor Burns has observed,
The main reason for Roosevelt’s methods . . . involved a tenacious effort to keep control
of the executive branch in the face of the centrifugal forces of the American political system. By
establishing in an agency one power center that counteracted another, he made each official more

7
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”), proposed giving power to the FTC to
oversee securities regulation. As one student of the Roosevelt presidency has noted, “[t]he
fundamental feature of the Thompson bill was disclosure, forbidding the sale of securities not
registered with the FTC. The bill made no effort to analyze the quality of stock issues or to
protect consumers from weak or fraudulent ones.”27 There were problems, however, with the
Thompson bill as well, primarily centering on its proposal to expand the power of the FTC to
rescind the registration of an issuer and its strict liability provisions.28 Roosevelt agreed with the
chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Rep. Sam Rayburn (DTX), that the bill was overly burdensome and brought in yet a third drafting team.29
This team, led by Felix Frankfurter,30 a proponent of “government-by-administrativeagency,”31 swiftly prepared a securities reform bill that remedied the deficiencies of the
Thompson proposal and that could pass. Frankfurter’s proposal continued to utilize the FTC as
the responsible securities regulatory agency and became known as the Landis-Cohen draft, after

dependent on White House support; the President in effect became the necessary ally and partner
of each. He lessened bureaucratic tendencies toward self-aggrandizement; he curbed any attempt
to gang up on him. He was, in effect, adapting the old method of divide and conquer to his own
purposes.
The problem, from Roosevelt’s standpoint, was one of power rather than of narrow
efficiency. His technique was curiously like that of Joseph Stalin, who used the overlapping
delegation of function, a close student of his methods has said, to prevent “any single chain of
command from making major decisions without confronting other arms of the state’s bureaucracy
and thus bringing the issues into the open at a high level.” Roosevelt, like Stalin, was a political
administrator in the sense that his first concern was power—albeit for very different ends.
BURNS, supra note 24, at 371, 373.
27
GEORGE MCJIMSEY, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 42 (2000).
28
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 56.
29
Id. Rayburn had “crusaded for tough securities regulation since his days as a young congressman under Woodrow
Wilson.” MCJIMSEY, supra note 27, at 41.
30
Felix Frankfurter, a friend of Roosevelt’s since the Wilson Administration, was a prolific faculty member at
Harvard Law School who became a confidant of President Roosevelt’s. For the lengthy relationship between
Frankfurter and FDR, see ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928–1945 (Max Freedman
annot., 1967). Frankfurter turned down Roosevelt’s offer of an appointment as Solicitor General and was later
appointed by Roosevelt to the United States Supreme Court in 1939. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 58.
31
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 62.
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Frankfurter’s assistants, James M. Landis and Benjamin V. Cohen.32 Their bill “broadened
liability to underwriters, distributors, and brokers instead of concentrating it on corporation
executives.”33 Congressman Rayburn introduced the Lanis-Cohen draft, and the measure quickly
passed the House with little debate. The Senate, however, still preferred the Thompson proposal,
and the two different bills ended up in a conference committee.34 Ultimately, using the House
version as its basis, the conference committee reached a compromise that both houses passed.
As enacted, however, the Securities Act of 1933 designated the FTC as the authoritative body to
regulate securities. 35 The new statute was, in a summary offered by Lawrence Friedman,
in fact essentially a disclosure law. People who sold securities had to register
them with the Federal Trade Commission. They had to disclose a wealth of
information about the securities, the underwriters, and the issuing company,
including balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements. Any prospectus dangled
before the public also had to contain much of this information.36
The Securities Act of 1933 was controversial from its inception, and the process of revising the
measure began almost immediately.
The stock exchanges, various Congressional committees, and even the Frankfurter team
were involved in the revision process. By this time, Landis had been appointed to the FTC to
administer the 1933 Act.37 A version known as the Fletcher-Rayburn38 bill was hotly debated
and went through several amendments.39 The most relevant to this discussion was an
amendment in the Senate Banking Committee by Sen. Carter Glass (D-VA) to “replace the
32

Landis and Cohen, along with Thomas G. Corcoran, were selected by Frankfurter to assist in drafting the
securities legislation. All were colleagues of Frankfurter’s at Harvard Law School. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 6163.
33
MCJIMSEY, supra note 27, at 42.
34
James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 41 (19591960).
35
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 70.
36
FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 164-165.
37
Federal Trade Commission, Oral Histories, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/oralhistory.shtm (last visited Mar. 15,
2010); SCHLESINGE, supra note 18, at 442.
38
Congressman Rayburn, supra, and Sen. Duncan U. Fletcher (D-FL), chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
which had conducted the Pecora hearings.
39
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 96-97.
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Federal Trade Commission and Federal Reserve Board as enforcement agencies with a new
three-person Securities Exchange Commission.”40 The rationale for transferring such
enforcement power from the FTC and the Federal Reserve Board to the proposed SEC was
addressed by Sen. Glass in a statement on the Senate floor in May of 1934 and in article by the
senator that appeared in the New York Times in April of that year. In his remarks on the Senate
floor, Sen. Glass noted:
It ought to be borne in mind that the Federal Trade Commission was not picked
by the President—for it is composed of a membership appointed by various
Presidents—nor confirmed by the Senate with the idea of its being charged with
the extremely complex and important duties which will devolve upon the special
commission [the SEC] provided for by the pending bill. I doubt whether the
members of the Federal Trade Commission know anything in the world about
stock-exchange transactions, unless some one or more of them may have been
stock speculators or brokers on the stock exchange.41
In the article that appeared in the New York Times, Sen. Glass wrote:
. . . I very decidedly object to having the Federal Reserve System allied or
aligned in any way with Stock Exchange transactions. The Federal Reserve Act
textually prohibits the Federal Reserve Board from including Stock Exchange
securities as collateral for rediscount at Federal Reserve Banks, and it was the
original purpose of Congress, which has been maintained to this day, to keep the
Federal Reserve System as far away from the Stock Exchange transactions as
possible.
The Federal Reserve Board has its hands full ordinarily to manage the
credits of the commercial banks which are members of the system, and the
attention of the board should not be diverted to other things which are foreign to
commercial banking and with which the Federal Reserve Board is not supposed to
have familiarity.
The same is true with respect to the Federal Trade Commission, the
statutory functions of which have nothing to do with Stock Exchange transactions
and the members of which are not supposed to have familiarity with such
transactions.42
40

SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 97.
Remarks of Sen. Carter Class, U.S. Senate, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., May 8, 1934, 78 CONG. REC. 8,286 (1934).
Apparently even the FTC’s Landis favored a new enforcement agency. SCHLESINGER, NEW DEAL at 466.
42
Carter Glass, New Market Bill Praised by Glass, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1934, at N11. See also Committee Trims
the Exchange Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1934, at 1.
41
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Despite turmoil from Sen. Duncan Fletcher aimed at keeping the FTC as the
regulatory agency, the Glass amendment took hold during the conference committee, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission was created43 as part of the final version of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”).44 The SEC was given jurisdiction
over both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act yet was provided with no clear mandate.
The SEC, which was comprised of five commissioners as equally divided between the
two parties as possible appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, was largely the
institution as it exists today. The chairman was to be selected from among the commissioners by
the President. President Roosevelt’s initial appointees to the SEC were the controversial Wall
Streeter Joseph P. Kennedy, FTC Commissioners James Landis and George Matthews, FTC
Chief Counsel Robert Healy, and Pecora. Though many had heralded Landis for the post,45
Kennedy was chosen as the SEC’s first chairman.46 (See Appendix A for timeline of SEC
chairmen.) The inaugural commissioners established organizational divisions, began
promulgating opinions, and, perhaps most importantly, began registering and inspecting
exchanges. In its first year, twenty-three hundred cases of potential securities fraud were
investigated.47 Efforts to “reassure capital” and restore the market were part of the “cooperative”
policy that Chairman Kennedy established.48
Chairman Kennedy, realizing the detail-oriented tasks that lay ahead were better suited
for lawyers, was ready to resign as of May 1935. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
43

SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 99.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
45
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 101-106.
46
Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners,
http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). For the controversy surrounding
Kennedy’s appointment, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 18, at 467-469.
47
Securities and Exchange Commission, First Annual Report, at 31 (June 30, 1935).
48
Joseph Kennedy, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Address at National Press Club (July 25,
1934).
44
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Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States (1935)49 convinced Kennedy otherwise.50 The Court
struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act,51 holding that it had effected an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Since the Act had been part of the New
Deal reform measures, other statutes were potentially at risk, including the securities acts. This
fear was soon realized. After Schechter, J. Edward Jones, an oil securities dealer challenged the
constitutionality of the 1933 Act. In 1936, a federal appeals court upheld the 1933 Act.52
Kennedy was re-elected chairman of the SEC in July 1935 but resigned in September of
that year in part due to his opposition to the Roosevelt-sponsored Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 (the “Holding Company Act”). Commissioner James Landis took over as
SEC chairman and spent the majority of his term involved in litigation regarding the Holding
Company Act.53
2.

The Securities and Exchange Commission Moving Forward

Landis left the SEC in 1937 to become Dean of Harvard Law School, and President
Roosevelt appointed William O. Douglas54 to become the third SEC chairman.55 Douglas’s
tenure was an active one, and he simultaneously pursued numerous initiatives such as continuing
efforts to reform over-the-counter markets and to establish SEC control under the provisions of
the Holding Company Act. Douglas accentuated the SEC’s position as the investor’s advocate

49

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Seligman, supra, note 4, at 121-122.
51
The National Industrial Recovery Act was a piece of New Deal legislation enacted during President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s first term. At issue in the Schechter case, supra, was the Live Poultry Code promulgated by the NIRA.
52
SEC v. Jones, — F. 2d — (D.C. Cir. 1935), reversed on other grounds, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936);
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 150-151. For a discussion of the Jones litigation see, note 367, infra.
53
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 122-138.
54
For Douglas’s tenure at the SEC, see WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN. THE EARLY YEARS: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 257-293, 297-308 (1974); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE
LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 106-172 (2003). President Roosevelt appointed Douglas to the United
States Supreme Court in 1939. MURPHY, supra, at 172-175.
55
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 154.
50
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and was quite adversarial in his actions.56 For instance, a battle between Douglas and the New
York Stock Exchange ensued during the crash of the late 1930s over Douglas’s demands for
reorganization of the Exchange, especially of the Exchange’s Board of Governors, and for
passage of trading rules. Douglas prevailed. Then in 1938, the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) was approved by the SEC as the over-the-counter market regulatory
organization.57
After these accomplishments and continued frustration and work with the Holding
Company Act, the SEC was then largely ignored by President Harry S. Truman and began a
decline in the late 1940s.58 President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s strict fiscal policy was the next
hurdle for the enforcement division of the SEC. Indeed, Joel Seligman writes that during the
Eisenhower Administration, the SEC “reached its nadir” and that the SEC’s “enforcement and
policy-making capabilities were less effective than at any other period in its history.”59 Though
the Hoover Commission an Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government identified a
backlog of examinations and the SEC acknowledged the need for strengthening its enforcement
activities, Eisenhower’s efforts and the Korean War necessitated staffing cuts and contributed to
a growing backlog of examinations.60 The SEC did not even have a permanent home; its office

56

Id. at 157.
Id. at 188.
58
See id. at 241.
59
Id. at 265.
60
Id. at 267. There actually were two Hoover Commissions, one created in 1947 and a second established in 1953,
both by acts of Congress. President Truman asked former President Herbert Hoover to chair the first (1947–1949),
whose aim was to recommend ways for limiting expenditures within the Executive Department “to the lowest
amount consistent with . . . efficient performance . . . eliminating duplication . . . consolidating services . . .
abolishing services . . . not necessary; and defining and limiting executive functions.” The second (1953–1955),
also chaired by Hoover upon appointment by President Eisenhower, was supposed to recommend changes in social
and economic policies. RONALD C. MOE, THE HOOVER COMMISSIONS REVISITED 1-4, 23-33, 81-90 (1982); DAVID
BURNER, HERBERT HOOVER: A PUBLIC LIFE 336-337 (1979).
57
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was moved to Philadelphia during World War II and then back to Washington, where it was
stuck in a temporary building.61
It was not until the 1960s that the SEC was reinvigorated. President John F. Kennedy,
the son of the first SEC head, even brought in former Chairman Landis to make a report on
regulatory agencies, though no additional White House support was obtained.62 William Cary
was the SEC chairman during the initial years of this period. Interestingly, Cary had been both a
student at Yale Law School and an SEC staff assistant to former Chairman Douglas. While
similar in many respects, Cary’s philosophy was different than that of the New Dealers, and
Cary’s leadership during the early 1960s was an integral part of the reinvigoration of the
agency.63 The Commission’s Special Study of the Securities Markets, completed in 1963, was
one of its most important and led to the 1964 Securities Act Amendments, among other
changes.64 These amendments were disclosure-oriented.65 Upon securing the passage of these
amendments, Cary resigned, and President Lyndon Johnson appointed Manuel Cohen as SEC
chairman.66
Much of the SEC’s next decade of work revolved around focusing increased attention on
regulating stock exchanges and mutual funds. During the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, the
securities industry experienced skyrocketing trading volumes and started to look at automating

61

JOHN C. GRAHAM, THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: A RESEARCH AND INFORMATION GUIDE 78 (1993)
62
See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 290-292. The Kennedy administration largely practiced “noninterference” with
regard to the SEC. See id. at 293.
63
Id. at 293-294.
64
GRAHAM, supra note 61, at 8. See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 304-319 for a discussion of other changes. Many
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their systems.67 However, under Cohen, the enforcement division of the Commission improved
and reversed the dismal activity of the division during the 1950s.68 Another issue that came
toward the end of Cohen’s tenure was the swell of conglomerate-mergers, which ultimately
involved the SEC, Congress, the accounting profession, and even other federal agencies, all of
which debated what standards and policies were best to discourage fraud but still promote
business-friendly guidelines. This debate revealed the deficiencies of the SEC’s regulation of
accounting principles and emphasized the agency’s primary focus on the overall securities
industry.69
Exploring the balance of regulatory activism by the SEC continued into the Nixon
presidency, especially since the first three chairmen selected by President Nixon were largely
political appointees. Seligman has observed, “[a]s chairman, [Hamer] Budge attempted to
reverse the activism of the later Cohen years.”70 Nixon’s second chairman, William Casey,
managed to land SEC budget and staffing increases but was still controversial and resigned early,
as did his successor, G. Bradford Cook. Ultimately, Nixon improved his SEC appointment
record by nominating Ray Garrett as chairman. Garrett and his colleagues made the SEC a
vibrant agency again.71 In 1975, for instance, the Garrett-led Commission even ended the
decades-long deregulation debate regarding fixed commission rates with Rule 19b-3, which
ended the use of fixed rates.72
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Major issues for the SEC between 1975 and 1981 included implementing technology into
the securities industry and facilitating the development of a national market system.73
Interestingly, corporate governance was not given much attention during this time period, and
the Commission completed no special studies like those published earlier on other securities and
corporate issues facing the SEC. However, progress on this front was made outside the SEC
through a Harvard Business School study by Myles Mace, which was perhaps “the most
influential academic work” regarding corporate boards and directors.74 Furthermore, the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force and SEC’s Enforcement Division vigorously investigated
corporate bribery cases and other improprieties. The Commission did not support new federal
corporate governance legislation but did push additional voluntary disclosure and director
independence measures up through the 1980s.75 The SEC and its mandate have continued to
evolve with the sustained growth of the market, the development of new financial instruments
and risk management techniques, globalization, and the changing investor environment (e.g.,
increasing number of institutional investors like public pension funds). Furthermore, the
Commission has had to work alongside the exchanges (e.g., NYSE) and other agencies (e.g.,
Commodities Futures Trading Commission) as part of the exchange-side of the SEC mandate.76
Though the SEC generally has maintained what one commentator has deemed a
reputation as “an outstanding example of the independent commission at its best,”77 the
sufficiency of the SEC’s mandatory disclosure system has been questioned at times throughout
the Commission’s history. University of Rochester Professor George Benston hypothesized that
“there was no value whatsoever to the mandatory disclosures required by the 1933 and 1934
73
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Securities Acts.”78 Failures by the SEC during the financial crisis of 2008 have led to further
questioning and criticisms of the SEC.79 However, the ability of the SEC to maintain a strong
disclosure environment lies within its enforcement authority. Legislation has expanded the
remedial functions, administrative agency process, and legal action tools of the SEC.80
Today, the SEC exists largely as it did at its inception. The SEC has five commissioners
and is a bipartisan independent agency. The Commission is charged with enforcing the federal
securities laws and has significant rule-making authority. In summary, the SEC has been
influenced by the political process, and the effects are evident in the cyclical nature of
Commission activism. Though the SEC is an independent agency, the reality is that its
commissioners are political appointees. The Commission’s broad jurisdiction, however, has not
always coincided with sufficient resources to adequately address every issue subject to the SEC’s
oversight. Therefore, the SEC largely became an overseer of industry self-regulation. Again, the
SEC is a disclosure-enforcement agency, and the SEC is at the center of the federal securities
laws’ mission to effect “the remediation of information asymmetries.”81 The Commission is not
in the business of judging or recommending securities offered to investors; rather, the SEC is
responsible for protecting investors through requiring and monitoring disclosure from entities
involved in the securities market.82
B.
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The Promulgation of Auditing Standards
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By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public
watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To
insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the
client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the
accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.
— U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-818 (1984) (Burger, C.J.)
***
This section will discuss the background of auditing standards for public companies in
the United States and will reveal the government’s neglect for accounting standards. The
promulgation of accounting principles and the SEC have interwoven histories. As Seligman has
noted, “Kennedy and Landis had viewed accounting reform as subordinate in importance to
capital flotation.”83 Moreover, Landis instructed the Commission’s Chief Accountant, Carman
Blough, not to develop “uniform or industry-wide accounting principles” but to, according to
Seligman, merely “pur[sue] a policy of cooperation with the accounting profession.”84 SEC
Chairman Douglas (1937-1939) also was unsuccessful in his efforts to change accounting
policies during his tenure. During this same time, SEC studies on the topic proved to be
ineffective, and the SEC’s chief accountant claimed to not have the resources to develop a
comprehensive accounting framework.85 Moreover, even decades later, SEC Chief Accountant
Andrew Barr was reluctant to engage the SEC’s authority in the accounting standard-setting role
except in limited cases.86
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Congress exhibited a similar sentiment. For instance, during 1933 hearings of the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee, the testimony of Colonel Arthur H. Carter, President of the
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, helped convince the legislators to rely
on the industry’s public auditors rather than on government auditors. Carter emphasized the
importance of independent auditors. Unfamiliarity with auditing and a lack of interest in the
topic on the part of senators is apparent from the hearing transcripts.87 Not surprisingly, the
accounting profession was self-regulated and promulgated accounting standards under the
supervision of the SEC. The securities acts did little to define auditing standards but did put the
topic on the table. Before Congress created the PCAOB, the SEC had relied upon private
organizations affiliated with the accounting profession to set and enforce auditing standards:
Accounting firms or their representatives controlled or funded those
organizations. As a result, “standards tend[ed] to be written to protect the
accounting firms.” Enforcement was similarly ineffective. While the profession
created a Public Oversight Board (“POB”) in the 1970s to conduct “peer
reviews,” for more than 20 years “there ha[d] never been a negative review of a
major firm.” And when the POB sought to investigate several firms in 2000, the
profession cut off its funding.88
For decades, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) was the
issuer of auditing standards, from which it is important to distinguish accounting standards (i.e.,
financial reporting standards) which the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issues.89
Both the SEC and AICPA recognize as authoritative the financial accounting standards
87
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promulgated by FASB. The AICPA Board of Directors is comprised of individuals from within
the industry and the accounting profession.
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the framework for developing and enforcing
auditing standards for public companies changed. Self-regulation of the profession was to be no
more. SOX created the PCAOB to oversee the auditors of public companies.90 The PCAOB is
charged with promulgating auditing and independence and ethics standards, which are subject to
approval by the SEC.91 Additionally, the PCAOB has inspection and enforcement authority over
auditors of public companies. In April 2003, the PCAOB adopted auditing standards issued by
the AICPA, effective as of April 16, 2003, as Interim Auditing Standards.92 Note that the
PCAOB does not oversee auditors of private entities, and the AICPA still promulgates standards
for these audits.93
C.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The dot-com bust in the late 1990s and highly publicized scandals in the early 2000s led

both the public and Congress to call for federal reform.94 Most argued that legislation to restore
investor confidence was needed. Growing skepticism of the thoroughness of accounting firm
peer reviews and the self-regulated profession only exacerbated this desire for intervention.95
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The scandal and failures at Enron, in particular, motivated Congress to respond to these calls for
reform, but it took the events at WorldCom to push SOX through quickly.96
Named after its sponsors, Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and Representative Michael
Oxley (R-OH), SOX mandated significant financial reporting and corporate governance reform
for public companies. Non-compliance with SOX can result in civil lawsuits against offending
companies and in criminal punishment in the form of fines and incarceration for officers of those
companies.97
1.

Sarbanes-Oxley Titles with Short Description

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is organized into eleven, discrete titles, as follows:
Title I – Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
Title I establishes the PCAOB, which is charged with registering accounting firms that
audit public companies. SOX vests in the PCAOB the authority to promulgate auditing
standards and also provides inspection and enforcement authority over registered firms.
Title II – Auditor Independence
Sections in this Title mandate audit firm independence standards, such as partner rotation
and reduction in conflicts of interest.
Title III – Corporate Responsibility
Title III requires that principal executive and financial officers (e.g., CEOs, CFOs) of a
company sign financial statements certifying that, to their knowledge, the statements contain no
material omissions or misstatements. Claw-backs of certain bonuses and payments and insider
trading prohibitions are also provided for in Title III.
Title IV – Enhanced Financial Disclosures
96
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Title IV establishes additional disclosures regarding management and material changes
(real-time disclosure through use of the 8-K Form) and prohibits personal loans to executives
from companies. Section 404 of SOX, in particular, requires assessment of internal controls both
by management and auditors.
Title V – Analyst Conflicts of Interest
This short Title addresses conflicts of interest regarding analysts recommending
securities in the exchanges.
Title VI – Commission Resources and Authority
Title VI’s provisions deal with appropriations, appearance requirements before the
Commission, and broker-dealer qualifications.
Title VII – Studies and Reports
Title VII mandates separate studies by the Comptroller General on the (1) consolidation
of public accounting firms, and (2) earnings manipulation by investment banks; and by the
Commission on (1) credit rating agencies, (2) violations by professionals, and (3) enforcement
actions.
Title VIII – Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability
Title VIII reviews federal penalties and sentencing guidelines and provides whistleblower
protection for employees of publicly traded companies. It also mandates the length of time audit
firms have to retain workpapers.
Title IX – White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements
Title IX provides for the continued revision of federal penalties for corporate fraud.

22
Title X – Corporate Tax Returns
Title X provides that it is the “sense of the Senate that the Federal income tax return of a
corporation should be signed by the chief executive officer.”
Title XI – Corporate Fraud and Accountability
Title XI also addresses federal penalties for fraud and gives the Commission authority to
bar persons from serving as directors or officers of publicly traded companies.
2.

On-Going Issues with Sarbanes-Oxley

Most of the issues that have arisen from SOX are beyond the scope of this paper, except
for any provisions relating to the constitutionality of the PCAOB. For instance, Section 404,
which requires an evaluation of internal controls, has generated significant backlash from the
business community.98
3.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

The PCAOB website states that:
the PCAOB is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation created by the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 to oversee the auditors of public companies in order to protect
investors and the public interest by promoting informative, fair, and independent
audit reports.99
SOX charges the PCAOB with setting standards and rules for auditing, quality control, ethics,
attestation, and independence. The PCAOB compels the registration of accounting firms that
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audit public companies and also has the authority to inspect these firms. Finally, the PCAOB is
vested with investigatory and enforcement authority.100
The revenue-raising function of the PCAOB is unusual but not unprecedented. SOX
requires that accounting firms pay registration fees, but the bulk of the PCAOB’s revenue comes
from SOX-mandated support fees paid by public companies.101 There is a nearly one-hundred
percent success rate in the collection of this support fee because, per PCAOB Rule 7103 (b),
PCAOB-registered auditors are, absent a waiver, prohibited from signing a report unless their
client has paid the fee.102 Without a report, the company falls out of SEC compliance.103 The
PCAOB was so created to avoid the turnover problems characteristic of the SEC and other
governmental agencies, as well as to be able to attract top staff, since the Board can pay higher
salaries than the government.
Since adopting the Interim Auditing Standards in April 2003, the PCAOB has issued
seven auditing standards:
AS No. 1: References in Auditors’ Reports to the Standards of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board
AS1 describes the adoption of the Interim Auditing Standards and provides that
“reference to generally accepted auditing standards in auditor’s reports was not
longer appropriate or necessary.”104
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AS No. 2: An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in
Conjunction With an Audit of Financial Statements
AS2 superseded by AS5, effective May 2007. AS2 was the standard for audits
over internal control, as required by SOX Section 404. “AS2 was far more
expensive and far more intrusive than expected. It came out of a natural
conservatism, post-Enron, and the manner in which it was implemented was far to
intrusive,”105 said Mark W. Olson, former PCAOB chairman.
AS No. 3: Audit Documentation
AS3 describes what documentation is required for audit procedures (e.g.,
memoranda, confirmations, correspondence, schedules, audit programs, and
letters of representation). This documentation must be accurate and conform to
certain procedures provided by AS3. Audit workpapers must be kept for seven
years, as provided by SOX.
AS No. 4: Reporting on Whether a Previously Reported Material Weakness Continues
to Exist
AS4 applies during an engagement to report on whether a previously reported
material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting still exists. The
standard gives guidance for performing this engagement.
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AS No. 5: An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated
with An Audit of Financial Statements
AS5 supersedes AS2 and directs the auditor’s assessment of management’s report
over internal controls (as required by SOX Section 404). This standard is less
controversial than its predecessor.
AS No. 6: Evaluating Consistency of Financial Statements
AS6 pertains to consistency in financial statements and provides guidance on
comparability, changes in accounting principle, correction of material
misstatement, and changes in classification in financial statements.
AS No. 7: Engagement Quality Review
Each audit engagement is required to have a quality review. AS7 provides
guidance for these reviews as well as the qualifications of the reviewers.
The PCAOB also promulgates rules on ethics and independence, has interim standards for other
aspects of the audit, and provides guidance on compliance with the auditing standards.106
4.

SEC Control over the PCAOB

During the legislative process that resulted in the enactment of SOX, Congress appears to
have initially considered vesting the new regulatory responsibilities in the SEC itself but rejected
that approach because the SEC was “‘already overtaxed’” and thus could not “‘effectively
discharge these additional requirements.’”107 Once it was decided to vest these duties in the
PCAOB, Congress nonetheless recognized the need for extensive, comprehensive SEC
supervisory control over the PCAOB both for constitutional reasons and to prevent duplication
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of efforts. SOX imposes certain controls over the PCAOB by the SEC by providing that the SEC
“shall have oversight and enforcement authority over the Board”108 as follows:

108

(1)

the SEC is empowered to set Board rules and procedures;109

(2)

the SEC is empowered to approve the budget of the Board;110

(3)

the SEC is empowered to approve the “reasonable annual accounting support fee
(or a formula for the computation thereof)” established by the Board “as may be
necessary or appropriate to establish and maintain the Board;”111

(4)

the SEC is empowered to “enhance, modify, cancel, reduce, or require the
remission of” any sanction imposed by the Board upon a registered public
accounting firm or associated person thereof, if the Commission, “having due
regard for the public interest and the protection of investors,” finds that the
sanction either is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of this Act or the
securities laws or is excessive, oppressive, inadequate, or otherwise not
appropriate to the finding or the basis on which the sanction was imposed;112

(5)

the SEC is empowered to review any action taken by the Board when a registered
public accounting firm or any associated person thereof refuses to testify, produce
documents, or otherwise cooperate with the Board in connection with an
investigation and when such action consists of (i) a suspension or bar of such
person from being associated with a registered public accounting firm or a
requirement that the registered public accounting firm end such association, (ii) a
suspension or revocation of the registration of the public accounting firm; and (iii)
such other lesser sanctions as the Board considers appropriate;113

(6)

the SEC is empowered to conduct an interim review, at the request of a registered
public accounting firm, of certain Board inspection determinations if such firm (i)
has provided the Board with a response to the substance of particular items in a
draft inspection report and disagrees with the assessments contained in any final
report prepared by the Board following such response or (ii) disagrees with the
determination of the Board that criticisms or defects identified in an inspection
report have not been addressed to the satisfaction of the Board;114

(7)

the SEC is empowered to limit or relieve the Board of its powers and to censure
or impose limitations upon the activities, functions, and operations of the Board if
the SEC finds that has violated or is unable to comply with any provision of SOX,
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the rules of the Board, or the securities laws or, without reasonable justification or
excuse, has failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule or any
professional standard by a registered public accounting firm or an associated
person thereof;115

D.

(8)

the SEC is empowered to remove or censure any member of the Board
who has willfully violated any provision of SOX, the rules of the Board, or the
securities laws; has willfully abused the member’s authority; or, without
reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance with any such
provision or rule or any professional standard by any registered public accounting
firm or any associated person thereof;116

(9)

the SEC is empowered to amend and to “abrogate, add to, and delete from” the
Board’s rules “to assure the fair administration of the [Board], conform the rules
promulgated by the Board to the requirements of Title I of SOX, or otherwise
further the purposes of SOX, the securities laws, and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to that Board;”117

(10)

the SEC is empowered to review de novo all Board adjudications in the form of
final disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Board upon an immediate stay when
an application for review is filed or sua sponte by the SEC;118

(11)

the SEC has the sole authority to determine whether the Board may sue and be
sued in any court;119 and

(12)

the SEC is empowered to exempt any foreign public accounting firm or any class
of such firms from any provision of SOX or the rules of the Board or the SEC
issued under SOX.120

The PCAOB Challenged
The constitutionality of the PCAOB has been challenged in Free Enterprise Fund v.

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“Free Enterprise Fund case”).121 At the center of
this challenge is the United States Constitution’s Appointments Clause and separation-of-powers
115
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principles. The petitioners allege that vesting the appointment of the members of the PCAOB in
the SEC violates the Appointments Clause and separation-of-powers principles and thus is
unconstitutional. A federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the PCAOB, and
a federal appellate court affirmed. The plaintiffs appealed these adverse rulings to the United
States Supreme Court, where a decision is pending.
III.

The Legal Issues

A.

The Legal Issues—Background and Overview
The primary legal issues raised by the PCAOB appeal now pending in the Supreme Court

arise under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the United States Constitution and under the
separation-of-powers provisions of the Constitution, but the case also poses potentially
significant collateral legal issues concerning the political accountability of the President for the
actions taken by independent agencies within the government and the ultimate burden of
persuasion in a case in which the plaintiffs assert a facial challenge, as opposed to an as-applied
challenge, to the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
B.

The Appointments Clause Issues
The Appointments Clause refers to Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution,

which provides in pertinent part as follows:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.122
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, the Appointments Clause is
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more than a matter of “etiquette or protocol”; it is among the significant structural
safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the
exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States,
the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the
Executive and Judicial Branches.123
The latter provision of the Appointments Clause, which is sometimes referred to as the
“Excepting Clause,” was “added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand
Convention, with little discussion. . . . [and] its obvious purpose is administrative
convenience.”124
For purposes of appointment, Supreme Court has declared, the Constitution “very clearly
divides all its officers into two classes”: first, principal officers of the United States who are
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and, second, inferior officers whose
appointment is vested in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of
departments.125 As the Supreme Court has noted on several occasions, “The line between
‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little
guidance into where it should be drawn.”126
Several factors are pertinent in determining whether one is a principal or inferior officer:
(1) whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher official within the Executive Branch, (2)
whether the officer’s duties are limited, (3) whether the officer’s jurisdiction is narrow, and (4)
whether the officer’s tenure is limited.127 Although the Supreme Court’s decisions have not
established exclusive criteria for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for
purposes of the Appointments Clause, the Court has found that the following governmental
positions constitute those of inferior officers: judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal
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Appeals,128 a special trial judge appointed to assist the United States Tax Court,129 an
independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,130 a United
States commissioner in federal district court proceedings,131 a federal district court clerk,132 a
vice consul charged temporarily with duties of the consul,133 and a federal election supervisor.134
“Generally speaking,” the Court has observed,
the term “inferior officer” connotes a relationship with some higher ranking
officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an “inferior” officer
depends on whether he has a superior. . . . [I]n the context of a Clause designed to
preserve political accountability relative to important Government assignments,
we think it evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.135
“What is significant,” the Court has concluded, “is that [inferior officers] have no power to
render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other
Executive officers.”136
In addition, certain governmental appointees are merely employees and not officers of the
United States at all and thus are not subject to the provisions of the Appointments Clause.
Among the factors considered in determining whether such an appointee is an officer of the
federal government are the appointee’s tenure, the duration of that tenure, the appointee’s
compensation, and the nature and duration of his or her duties.137 When the appointee’s duties
are occasional or temporary as opposed to continuing and permanent and when no regular
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appropriation is made for the appointee’s compensation, the appointee might be determined to be
a governmental employee rather than an officer of the government.138
Other than in Article II, Section 4, which provides for the removal of the President and
Vice President and all civil officers of the United States by impeachment for high crimes and
misdemeanors, the Constitution does not contain any provision for the removal from office of
officers of the United States. “The subject,” the Supreme Court has noted, “was not discussed in
the Constitutional Convention,”139 and there has since remained an extended controversy about
whether administrative officers—i.e., officers of administrative agencies within the Executive
Branch and those of administrative agencies whose functions and powers are intended to be
independent of the Executive Branch—may be removed in the President’s sole discretion or
whether Congress may play a role in such removals or limit the President’s power to remove
such officers. The positions of the respective sides to the controversy have been described as
follows:
The argument supporting presidential discretion holds that the chief
executive must be free to remove those subordinates who fail to meet the
president’s expectations or who are not loyal to the administration’s policy
objectives. It would be unreasonable to require the approval of Congress before
such officials could be dismissed. Such a requirement might well paralyze the
executive branch, particularly when the legislature and the presidency are under
the control of different political parties.
The argument for legislative participation in the [removal] process holds
that the Constitution anticipates Senate action. If the president can appoint major
executive department officials only with senatorial approval, it is reasonable to
infer that the chief executive can remove administrators only by going through the
same process and obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate.140
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1.

Myers v. United States

Myers v. United States141 involved the removal of a postmaster on order by the President
of the United States. An 1876 act of Congress gave the President the authority to appointment
postmasters by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Pursuant to the statute, President
Woodrow Wilson appointed Frank Myers as a first-class postmaster of Portland, Oregon, in
1917. The term of his appointment was for four years. In 1920, Wilson asked Myers to resign.
Myers refused, and, acting under Wilson’s orders, the Postmaster General fired Myers. Myers
filed suit in the U.S. Court of Claims for his salary from the date of his removal. The Court of
Claims ruled against Myers,142 who appealed his case to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Chief Justice William Howard Taft143 delivered the opinion of the Court. Providing a
tedious account of the legislative deliberations of the First Congress regarding the debate over
the President’s appointment power,144 the Chief Justice wrote:
The history of the clause by which the Senate was given a check upon the
President’s power of appointment makes it clear that it was not prompted by any
desire to limit removals…[Rather, it] was to lodge in the Senate…power to
prevent the President from making too many appointments from the larger
States.145
It is important to point out that Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution vests the executive power
of the government in the President (the “Vesting Clause”) and that Section 3 of Article II
provides that “he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed” (the “Take Care
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Clause”),146 both of which suggest that the president should of necessity be able to select and
remove officers acting under his direction. Such was the conclusion that had been reached by
the Court in Shurtleff v. United States,147 a case involving President William McKinley’s
removal from office of a general appraiser of merchandise who had been appointed by
McKinley’s predecessor. In Shurtleff, the Court held that the President has the constitutional
authority to remove officers even if they were appointed by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Furthermore, the consent (or rejection) of an appointment by the Senate is different
than the ability to prevent the removal of an officer. As Chief Justice Taft wrote:
The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of
advising and consenting to appointment, and when the grant of the executive
power is enforced by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, it emphasizes the necessity of including within the executive power as
conferred the exclusive power of removal.148
“The power to remove officers, we have recognized, is a powerful tool for control.” Thus
wrote Justice Antonin Scalia in his opinion in 1997 for the Court in Edmond v. United States.149
More than seven decades earlier, the Court in Myers concluded that the Appointments Clause
“give[s] to Congress the power to limit and regulate removal of such inferior officers by heads of
departments when it exercises its constitutional power to lodge the power of appointment with
them”:150
Congress, in committing the appointment of such inferior officers to the heads of
departments, may prescribe incidental regulations controlling and restricting the
latter in the exercise of the power of removal.151
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The authority for the Myers Court’s conclusion came from the Court’s earlier decision in United
States v. Perkins,152 which recited with approval the following passage from the opinion of the
Court of Claims that was then under review:
We have no doubt that when congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior
officers in the heads of departments, it may limit and restrict the power of
removal as it deems best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in
congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and
regulate the removal by such laws as congress may enact in relation to the officers
so appointed.153
Ultimately, the Supreme Court thus affirmed the Court of Claims’ judgment against
Myers. The Chief Justice wrote, “[the Court] must therefore hold that the provision of the law of
1876, by which the unrestricted power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to the
President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid.”154 In effect, the Court held that
Congress cannot limit the President’s removal power.
2.

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States

Less than a decade later, in 1935, the Court decided Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States,155 which characterized much of Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Myers as dicta (and thus
not binding) and confined Myers to presidential removal of officers within the Executive Branch.
President Herbert Hoover had appointed William Humphrey to the Federal Trade Commission in
1931. Humphrey’s appointment was for a seven-year term, which was scheduled to expire in
1938. Under the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, FTC commissioners could be
removed from office by the President “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
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office.”156 However, in 1933, President Roosevelt asked for Humphrey’s resignation due to their
differences regarding policy and the FTC. Humphrey declined, and Roosevelt sent
correspondence effectively removing him from the FTC. Humphrey filed suit in the U.S. Court
of Claims, seeking an award of compensation for the period of service from the date of his
discharge through the end of his statutory term. The Court of Claims certified two questions to
the Supreme Court:157 (1) Does the FTC Act’s provision that “any commissioner may be
removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” limit the
President’s removal authority to these causes only and (2) if so, is such a restriction
constitutional?158 The government drew on Shurtleff, but the Court distinguished the
appointment of an FTC Commissioner as involving a fixed term whereas the potentially
unlimited appointment in Shurtleff had not.159 This creative interpretation allowed the Court to
ignore the precedent established by Shurtleff. Removal power thus was limited by the Court in
Humphrey’s Executor to facilitate the independence of the FTC, and, hence, the first question
was answered in the affirmative.160 Faced with the second question, the Court yet again
distinguished precedent and limited Myers to having only “decided…that the President has
power to remove a postmaster of the first class without the advice and consent of the Senate.”161
This narrow reading plus “putting aside [the] dicta”162 of Myers meant to the Court that its earlier
decision had pertained only to “purely executive officers.”163 The FTC, however, the Court
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found, “acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially,”164 and, hence, an
administrative agency acting in this manner is not solely Executive in nature. Furthermore,
ensuring that agencies like the FTC function independently and maintaining fidelity to the
separation-of-powers principle demand that the President’s removal authority be limited to “for
cause” pursuant to the statute. Thus, the second certified question was answered by the Court in
the affirmative.
The Court’s unanimous decision in Humphrey’s Executor relied on a functions analysis.
Was the FTC not, however, carrying out the laws of the United States, thus rendering it an arm
of the President as it relates to the Take Care Clause? Regardless, the case effected a change in
thinking about the Appointments Clause that remains a central feature of the analysis used in
current Appointments Clause cases. There was no dissenting opinion in the case.
3.

Wiener v. United States

Scarcely more than a quarter of a century later, in 1958, the Court in Wiener v. United
States165 reaffirmed the principles that had been announced in Humphrey’s Executor. At issue in
Weiner was whether the President had the constitutional or statutory power to remove from
office a member of the War Claims Commission (the “WCC”), a body that had been created by
Congress in the War Claims Act of 1948 to receive, consider, and adjudicate claims for the
compensation of individuals who had sustained injuries at the hands of enemies of the United
States during World War II. The statute provided that the WCC was to be comprised of three
members who were to be appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate and
that the decisions of the WCC were to be final and “not subject to review by any other official of
the United States or by any court.” Each commission member was to serve a term that ended

164
165

Id.
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).

37
when the WCC had finalized its responsibilities and gone out of existence. The War Claims Act
contained no provisions addressing how and under what circumstances a WCC commissioner
might be removed from office prior to the completion of the commission’s work.
In June of 1950, President Harry S. Truman appointed Myron Wiener to the WCC, and
shortly thereafter, Wiener’s appointment was confirmed by the Senate. When President
Truman’s successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, took office, he wished to replace the WCC’s
commissioners with members of his own selection. When President Eisenhower asked for the
resignations of the incumbent WCC commissioners, however, they refused. In December of
1953, the President ordered them dismissed and made recess appointments to the WCC. When
Congress assembled in January of 1954, the President sent the names of the new appointees to
the Senate for confirmation, but the Senate had not confirmed the President’s nominations when
the WCC was abolished by statute later in 1954. Wiener thereafter filed a petition with the U.S.
Court of Claims, seeking payment of his salary as a WCC commissioner from the date of his
removal from office by the President in late 1953 through the last day of the WCC’s existence in
1954. A divided Court of Claims dismissed the petition, and Wiener appealed the adverse
decision to the Supreme Court.166
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Declaring in his opinion for the Court that the
case presented “a variant of the constitutional issue decided in Humphrey’s Executor,” Justice
Frankfurter reiterated that the Court in Humphrey’s Executor had narrowly confined the scope of
the Myers decision to include only “‘all purely executive officers’” and had explicitly
disapproved the dictum in Myers that the President has the inherent constitutional power to
remove members of a quasi-judicial bodies:
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The assumption was short-lived that the Myers case recognized the President’s
inherent constitutional power to remove officials, no matter what the relation of
the executive to the discharge of their duties and no matter what restrictions
Congress may have imposed regarding the nature of their tenure.167
“[T]he most reliable factor for drawing an inference regarding the President’s power of
removal in [this] case,” Frankfurter wrote, thus “is the nature of the function that Congress
vested in the War Claims Commission.”168 Characterizing that function as adjudicatory or quasijudicial in nature and noting that the WCC’s determinations were final and not reviewable by
any court, Frankfurter concluded that the WCC—like the FTC in Humphrey’s Executor—had
been intended by Congress to be “‘entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or
indirect,’” of either the President or the Congress.169 Then, finding that “[t]he ground of
President Eisenhower’s removal of [Wiener from the WCC] was precisely the same as President
Roosevelt’s removal of Humphrey [from the FTC]” and that Wiener as a WCC commissioner
had not exercised any purely executive powers, the Court concluded that just as the Court in
Humphrey’s Executor had determined that no power to remove such an official is given to the
President directly by the Constitution and that none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute,
so, too, the Court in this case was compelled to conclude that the President had no such removal
power even when, as here, Congress had said nothing in the War Claims Act about how and
under what circumstances a WCC commissioner might be removed before the expiration of his
tenure in office. “The philosophy of Humphrey’s Executor, in its explicit language as well as its
implications,” Justice Frankfurter wrote, “precludes such a claim.”170
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By re-affirming the principles announced in Humphrey’s Executor the Court in Wiener
thus “brought an authoritative end to questions regarding the extent of the [P]resident’s power to
remove officeholders at his discretion alone.”171
4.

Buckley v. Valeo

Buckley v. Valeo172 dealt with the constitutionality of several provisions of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as amended, the “FEC Act”),173
which created the Federal Election Commission (the “FEC”). Under the FEC Act, the FEC was
to be comprised of eight (8) members selected as follows: two (2) non-voting members selected
by the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of the House of Representatives; and six (6) voting
members, to be confirmed by both the House of Representatives and Senate, comprised of two
(2) appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate, two (2) appointed by the Speaker of the
House, and two (2) appointed by the President of the United States.174 The statute vested the
FEC with broad authority. The commission, for instance, had rulemaking and adjudicative
powers and served as a clearinghouse for information regarding federal elections. The FEC’s
adjudicative authority included the power to pursue civil legal actions to enforce and implement
the FEC Act.175
The Court, in its per curiam opinion, broke down the FEC’s authority into three
categories, as follows: (1) flow of information (receipt, dissemination and investigation); (2)
fleshing out the statute (rulemaking); and (3) compliance (informal procedures and civil suits).176
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The Court concluded that the functions comprising the first category, largely informative and
investigatory, were justified but that those in the third category, enforcement, were not. The
Court held that the enforcement power of the FEC clearly violated the Appointments Clause
because these were functions that should be carried out by “Officers of the United States.”177
“[A]ny appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an
‘Officer of the United States,’” the Court concluded, “and must, therefore, be appointed in the
manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of ... Article [II].”178 Relying upon Myers and Ex parte
Hennen,179 the Court concluded that FEC commissioners must be “at the very least, such
‘inferior officers’ within the meaning of that Clause.”180 With regard to appointment, two
classes of officers exist,181 and “[u]nless…elsewhere provided for, all officers of the United
States are to be appointed in accordance with the [Appointments] Clause.”182 Even faced with its
earlier decision in Humphrey’s Executor, the Court reiterated its view that, even when agencies
are clearly intended by Congress to be independent of executive authority, “the members of
[such] independent agencies are not independent of the Executive with respect to their
appointments.”183
5.

Morrison v. Olson

Morrison v. Olson184 provides yet another approach to the Appointments Clause. At
issue in Morrison were the independent-counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of
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1978 (from time to time referred to as the “EGA”),185 which created an independent counsel to
investigate and prosecute high-ranking Executive Branch officials for federal criminal violations.
The EGA provided for the appointment by a special judicial panel (the “Special Division”) of an
independent counsel upon a preliminary investigation by the Attorney General and after a
determination by the Attorney General that such an appointment was warranted. The EGA
vested in the independent counsel the “full power and independent authority to exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney
General, and any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice.”186 Congress retained
no control over the independent counsel other than providing for periodic reports on his or her
activities to be submitted to Congress and retaining the ultimate authority to impeach and remove
him or her from office upon conviction. The independent counsel could be removed, short of
impeachment, in two ways: (1) by the Attorney General “for cause” and (2) upon the completion
of the independent counsel’s investigation. The Court of Appeals invalidated the Ethics in
Government Act on various constitutional grounds, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the
case.187
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison, written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
examined several issues. First, the Court concluded that the independent counsel was an
“inferior officer” for purposes of the Appointments Clause based upon consideration of the
following factors: (1) the independent counsel could be removed by a higher Executive Branch
official, (2) the independent counsel performed limited duties, (3) the jurisdiction of the
independent counsel was limited, and (4) the tenure of the independent counsel was limited. The
Court made this determination, however, without defining what constitutes an “inferior officer”
185
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or a “principal officer” and without clearly delineating how one is distinguishable from the
other.188
A second issue in Morrison was whether the EGA’s providing for the interbranch
appointment of the independent counsel by the special panel of federal judges violated the
Excepting Clause of the Appointments Clause. The Court initially noted that the Excepting
Clause does not, on its face, prohibit interbranch appointments. Moreover, by including the
clause “as they think proper” in the Excepting Clause, the framers of Article II seemed “clearly
to give Congress significant discretion to determine whether it is ‘proper’ to vest the appointment
of . . . executive officials in the ‘courts of law.’” Ultimately, therefore, the Court held that
interbranch appointments are allowable under the Excepting Clause and that vesting authority for
the appointment of the independent counsel in the Special Division was permissible.189
6.

Freytag v. Commissioner

Another major relevant case in the construction of the Excepting Clause portion of the
Appointments Clause is Freytag v. Commissioner,190 in which the constitutionality of a
congressional statutory provision authorizing the appointment of a special trial judge (formerly
know as a “commissioner”191) appointed by the United States Tax Court (the “Tax Court”) was
at issue.
The chief judge of the Tax Court had the authority, by statute, to appoint special trial
judges for certain types of complex litigation in that court.192 During review of the petitioners’
case in 1984, the chief judge of the Tax Court assigned a special judge to the case subsequent to
the illness and retirement of the initial Tax Court judge. The special trial judge, Carleton Powell,
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found that the petitioners owed additional taxes, and the chief judge adopted the opinion of Judge
Powell as that of the Tax Court.193 The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the argument of the
petitioners was that the appointment of the special trial judge had been in violation of the
Appointments Clause.
As a preliminary matter, the Court emphasized that the Appointments Clause was not
designed only or even primarily to protect Executive Branch prerogatives. Justice Blackman
wrote in the Court’s opinion that “[t]he Appointments Clause prevents Congress from dispensing
power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint,…[and] the
structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one Branch of
government but of the entire Republic.”194 The Court went on to use Buckley to hold that the
special trial judges are “inferior officers” for Appointments Clause purposes. Rejecting the
Commissioner’s assertion that the judges are mere employees who are not subject to the
provisions of the Appointments Clause, the Court noted that the judges perform more than mere
ministerial tasks, are given significant responsibility by law, and exercise “significant
discretion.”195 The Court distinguished the case at hand from Morrison on the ground that
Freytag did not involve an interbranch appointment.196
The Court also rejected the Commissioner’s argument that “every part of the Executive
Branch is a department the head of which is eligible to receive the appointment power” and held
that the Tax Court “is not a ‘Department.’”197 In deciding that the Tax Court is not a department,
however, the Court left open the question of what constitutes a “Head of Department”198 for

193

Freytag, 501 U.S. at 872 (petitioners had engaged in a tax shelter scheme, Id. at 871).
Id. at 880.
195
Id. at 882; see Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344.
196
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883.
197
Id. at 885.
198
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
194

44
purposes of the Excepting Clause. Instead, the Court ruled that the Tax Court was one of the
“Courts of Law.”199 Justice Blackmun wrote that, despite traditionally having been viewed as
part of the Executive Branch, “the Tax Court’s function and role…[resemble]…those of the
federal district courts, which indisputably are ‘Courts of Law.’”200 Furthermore, the
Appointments Clause “does not limit ‘the Courts of Law’ to those courts established under
Article III of the Constitution.”201
In his concurring opinion,202 Justice Scalia disagreed on this point, writing that “the
definite article ‘the’ [in the Appointments Clause] obviously narrows the class of eligible ‘Courts
of Law’ to those Courts or Law envisioned by the Constitution. Those are Article III courts, and
the Tax Court is not one of them.”203 Justice Scalia also considered what constitutes a
“Department,” though he did not provide a clear standard. While not binding, the language
provided by Justice Scalia is important to one of the principal issues in the Free Enterprise Fund
case. He wrote:
A number of factors support the proposition that “Heads of Departments”
includes the heads of all agencies immediately below the President in the
organizational structure of the Executive Branch…This evident meaning -- that
the term “Departments” means all independent executive establishments -- is also
the only construction that makes sense of Art. II, 2’s sharp distinction between
principal officers and inferior officers…In short, there is no reason, in text,
judicial decision, history or policy, to limit the phrase “the Heads of Departments”
in the Appointments Clause to those officials who are members of the President’s
Cabinet.204
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If Justice Scalia were to have garnered a majority in Freytag, any non-Article III court would
have been treated as a Department.205 Ultimately, despite the debate over classifying the Tax
Court, the United States Supreme Court held that the appointment of the special trial judge had
been valid under the Appointments Clause.
7.

Edmond v. United States

At issue in the most recent of the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause cases, Edmond
v. United States,206 was the constitutionality of the appointment of civilian judges to the Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (the “CGCCA”) by the Secretary of Transportation. The
CGCCA, which is composed of both military and civilian judges, hears appeals from decisions
of court martial, and decisions by the CGCCA are reviewable by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. Because the military and civilian judges who served on the
CGCCA at the time of the Edmond case had been designated by Congress as officers of the U.S.
Department of Transportation207 and because of the Court’s decision in Weiss v. United States,208
the Secretary of Transportation had reappointed the two civilian judges then serving on the
CGCCA.209
Justice Scalia rejected the petitioners’ argument that Article 66(a) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (the “UCMJ”)210 gives the Judge Advocate General exclusive authority to
appoint the judges of the CGCCA. Instead, Justice Scalia held that this provision of the UCMJ
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concerns “not the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges, but only their
assignment”211 and that, accordingly, the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to appoint
CGCCA judges.212 The Court then turned to the constitutionality of the Secretary’s
appointments. Using Appointments Clause precedent, Justice Scalia reiterated the Court’s longstanding recognition that the Excepting Clause language had been added to the Constitution for
the “obvious purpose [of] administrative convenience”213 and that, although several of the
Court’s earlier cases had provided examples of “inferior officers,”214 the Court had not yet
fashioned a set of controlling criteria for distinguishing between “inferior officers” and
“principal officers.” Rejecting the applicability of most of the factors that had been relied upon
in Morrison to the facts in Edmond, Justice Scalia instead focused on the factor in Morrison that
considers whether there is a relationship that exists between the officer in question and some
higher ranking officer or officers below the President. “[W]hether one is an ‘inferior’ officer,”
Scalia wrote,
depends on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that other officers may be
identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a
greater magnitude. It that were the intention, the Constitution might have used
the phrase “lesser officer.” Rather, in the context of a clause designed to preserve
political accountability relative to important government assignments, we think it
evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is directed and supervised
at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the
advice and consent of the Senate.215
Such a supervisory relationship exists, the Court found, between the CGCCA judges and
both the Judge Advocate General (the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation was
at the time, ex officio, the Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard), which has oversight and
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removal authority with respect to the judges, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, which exercises the power of judicial review over decisions by the judges of the
CGCCA.216 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the CGCCA judges were inferior officers for
purposes of the Appointments Clause. “What is significant,” Scalia emphasized,
is that the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals have no power to render a final
decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other
executive officers.217
The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the CGCCA judges more closely
resemble Tax Court judges (who the Court in Morrison, according to the petitioners, implied
were principal officers) than they do the special trial judges whose appointments were at issue in
Morrison. “We note initially,” Justice Scalia wrote,
that Freytag does not hold that Tax Court judges are principal officers; only the
appointment of special trial judges was at issue in that case. Moreover, there are
two significant distinctions between Tax Court judges and Court of Criminal
Appeals judges. First, there is no Executive Branch tribunal comparable to the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces that reviews the work of the Tax Court; its
decisions are appealable only to courts of the Third Branch [i.e., the federal
judiciary under Article III]. And second, there is no officer comparable to a Judge
Advocate General who supervises the work of the Tax Court, with power to
determine its procedural rules, to remove any judge without cause, and to order
any decision submitted for review. Freytag does not control our decision
here.218
The Court determined, therefore, that, because the judges are inferior officers and
because Congress had properly authorized the Secretary of Transportation to appoint the
CGCCA judges in question, the appointments were constitutional under the Appointments
Clause.219
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C.

The Separation-of-Powers Issues
Because of its significance as a tool for control, the power to remove governmental

officers can also raise significant separation-of-powers issues.
The Supreme Court stated the obvious when in 1983 it noted that “[t]he Constitution
sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined
categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.”220 The purpose of this separation-of-powers
feature of the Constitution was to “diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty,”221 a purpose
echoed by James Madison in Federalist No. 47 when he wrote that “[t]he accumulation of all
powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many . . .
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”222 Although the Constitution’s
diffusion of power among the three branches can produce “conflicts, confusion, and
discordance” within the government, “it was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous,
and open debate on the great issues affecting the people, and to provide avenues for the operation
of checks on the exercise of governmental power.”223
The Supreme Court first comprehensively addressed the separation-of-powers
ramifications of the removal power in Myers, in which Chief Justice Taft, in his opinion for the
Court, declared unconstitutional the statute requiring Senate approval of the President’s exercise
of the power to remove a postmaster on the ground that for Congress to retain the power to
participate in the exercise of such power “would be . . . to infringe [upon] the constitutional
principle of the separation of governmental powers.”224 In its subsequent decision in
Humphrey’s Executor, the Court reiterated “the crucial role of separated powers in our
220
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system”225 when it sustained the constitutionality of congressional limitations on the President’s
power to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission:
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments
of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or
indirect, of either of the others has often been stressed, and is hardly open to
serious question. So much is implied in the very fact of the separation of the
powers of these departments by the Constitution, and in the rule which recognizes
their essential co-equality.226
Of special concern to the framers of the Constitution were the dangers of congressional
usurpation of the functions of the Executive Branch. As the Court observed in Bowsher:
[T]he debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are
replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National
Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.227
Hardly more than a half-century later, the Court revisited the separation-of-powers
repercussions of the removal power in Bowsher v. Synar.
1.

Bowsher v. Synar

The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (the “Balanced Budget
Act”)228 vested in the Comptroller General the authority to take certain steps to control the
federal budget deficit. Specifically, each year the directors of the Office of Management and
Budget (the “OMB”) and the Congressional Budget Office (the “CBO”) were required to prepare
independent estimates of the amount of the anticipated federal budget deficit for the ensuing
fiscal year and if the projected deficit exceeded the maximum targeted deficit amount designated
by the Balanced Budget Act for that fiscal year by more than a specified amount, the directors of
the OMB and the CBO were to calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget reductions
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that would be necessary to ensure that the deficit for that fiscal year did not exceed the maximum
targeting deficit amount. The Balanced Budget Act further provided that the directors of the
OMB and the CBO then were to submit a joint report containing their deficit estimates and
budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General, who, after having reviewed the same,
was directed to report his conclusions to the President, who in turn was required to order the
spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General.229 Bowsher v. Synar challenged the
constitutionality of this feature of the Balanced Budget Act on several grounds, including an
assertion that the statute violated the separation-of-powers feature of the Constitution.
Central to the Bowsher case was the removability of the Comptroller General, an officer
who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate but who, by statute is removable
only by Congress, either by impeachment or by joint resolution based on certain specified
grounds.230 Chief Justice Warrant Burger’s opinion for the Court found that the Comptroller
General had consistently over an extended period of time been viewed as part of the Legislative
Branch and concluded that this arrangement, coupled with the congressional removal provisions,
meant that the Comptroller General could not exercise executive powers.231 The Court
determined, however, that the Balanced Budget Act had vested the Comptroller General with
executive power, since he could “exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application
of the Act...[and] must interpret…the Act”232 before mandating what cuts the President was
required to make. “Decisions of that kind,” the Court observed, “are typically made by officers
charged with executing a statute.”233 After passing the Balanced Budget Act, in other words,
Congress, in effect, had impermissibly attempted to retain control over enforcement of the Act,
229
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since one of its own officers—the Comptroller General—was charged with carrying out the
statute’s mandates,234 and, simply put, Congress must not retain control over any executive
functions. The Court thus affirmed the decision by a special three-judge panel of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia invalidating the Balanced Budget Act.235 The Court,
rather than perform “statutory surgery,”236 elected to allow the Balanced Budget Act’s fallback
provisions237 go into effect and stayed the judgment for no more than 60 days.238
2.

Morrison v. Olson

The Court in Morrison also held that the Government in Ethics Act did undermine the
Executive Branch, so no separation-of-powers problem existed. Distinguishing the case from
Bowsher, the Court noted that, here, Congress was not trying impermissibly to retain control
over the execution of a statute. With regard to removal power, the Court characterized the case
as being more like Humphrey’s Executor than Myers.239 The appellees argued the case was
different from Humphrey’s Executor because the independent counsel, unlike an FTC
commissioner, performed a “core executive function.”240 Significantly, however, the Court
chose not to define what “core executive function” is. Moreover, the Court was of the view that
the determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a “good
cause”-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot be
made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as “purely executive.”
The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid
categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the
President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s
exercise of the “executive power” and his constitutionally appointed duty to “take
234
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care that the laws be faithfully executed” under Article II. Myers was
undoubtedly correct in its holding, and in its broader suggestion that there are
some “purely executive” officials who must be removable by the President at will
if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role. But as the Court noted in
Wiener:
The assumption was short-lived that the Myers case recognized the
President’s inherent constitutional power to remove officials no matter
what the relation of the executive to the discharge of their duties and no
matter what restrictions Congress may have imposed regarding the nature
of their tenure.
At the other end of the spectrum from Myers, the characterization of the agencies
in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener as “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” in
large part reflected our judgment that it was not essential to the President’s proper
execution of his Article II powers that these agencies be headed up by individuals
who were removable at will. We do not mean to suggest that an analysis of the
functions served by the officials at issue is irrelevant. But the real question is
whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the
officials in question must be analyzed in that light.
....
This is not a case in which the power to remove an executive official has been
completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the President
to ensure the “faithful execution” of the laws. Rather, because the independent
counsel may be terminated for “good cause,” the Executive, through the Attorney
General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently
performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the
provisions of the [Ethics in Government] Act.241
The Morrison Court, therefore, held that it did not violate the Appointments Clause for
Congress to vest appointment of the independent counsel in the Special Division; that the powers
granted to the Special Division under the EAG did not violate Article III of the Constitution; and
that the EAG did not violate the separation-of-powers feature of the Constitution by
impermissibly interfering with the functions of the Executive Branch.242
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D.

The Accountability Issue
Related but at the same time collateral to the separation-of-powers issues is the separate

issue of whether, and if so the extent to which, Congress might be free to render independent
agencies “unaccountable to the public through a democratically-elected branch of
government.”243 As one commentator has noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in “Morrison on
its face leaves Congress tremendous leeway to configure independent agencies in a manner that
severs them from traditional mechanisms of accountability.”244
In his opinion for the Court in Edmond, Justice Scalia noted, “By requiring the joint
participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure
public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good
one.”245 The rationale for such accountability, according to Justice Scalia, was provided by
Alexander Hamilton in his Federalist No. 77 essay:
The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and
absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of
the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good
intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive
for nominating, and the senate for approving, would participate, though in
different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.246
Justice Scalia’s observation was made in obvious reference to the provisions of the
Appointments Clause relating to principal officers whose appointments are required to be made
by the President by and with the consent of the Senate and not in connection with the Excepting
Clause. The cases do not provide a clear answer to the question of whether, as a constitutional
requirement, the notion of accountability must extend beyond Presidential political answerability
for the actions of principal officers within the Executive Branch and extend to answerability for
243
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the actions of every one of the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of inferior officers—regardless of
whether appointed by the President, by the heads of departments, or by the courts of law—within
the federal government, as opposed to all inferior officers within the Executive Branch.
At least one noted constitutional scholar has suggested that perhaps the political
accountability doctrine should, indeed, extend at least to those lower-level inferior officers
within the federal government who are appointed by persons who are themselves not accountable
politically to the President or to anyone who is accountable to the President. Professor Laurence
H. Tribe has described the potential problem in the following manner:
[I]n the particular situation in which an inferior officer is appointed by persons
who are themselves not politically accountable . . . ongoing supervision by a
politically accountable official, whether by the President or by someone serving at
the President’s pleasure, seems particularly important. In such circumstances,
where there is little or no political accountability at the front end for the choice of
that officer, a ‘for cause’ limitation on removal that renders political supervision
impossible appears troubling from an accountability perspective.247
A statement by Justice John Paul Stevens in his now “famous opinion” for the Court in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council248 has led to some speculation that
the doctrine of political accountability does (or should) extend at least to inferior officers serving
in agencies within the Executive Branch.249 At issue in the Chevron case was a question under
administrative law of whether the intermediate appellate court, rather than the applicable
administrative agency, had properly construed the definition of a term contained in a rule
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) in the light of certain
amendments to the Clean Air Act that were enacted in 1977. Before concluding that the
appellate court had erred, Justice Stevens observed that the statutory amendments had
represented an attempt on the part of Congress to accommodate “the economic interest in
247
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permitting capital improvements to continue and the environmental interest in improving air
quality”; that the subsequent rules promulgated by the EPA (including those under challenge)
reflected a change in policy brought about by a change in presidential administrations in 1981;
and that the ultimate remedy sought by the respondents, an environmental advocacy group, lay
with the two political branches of the government, i.e., the President or Congress, and not with
the judiciary. The truism articulated by Justice Stevens (with the language that has given rise to
the suggestion that the political accountability doctrine should apply to agencies within the
Executive Branch highlighted in italics) occurs in the following context:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests,
but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an
agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the government to make such
policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. When
a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the
challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:
“Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”250
One way of interpreting Justice Stevens’s observation, of course, is that it appears in a decision
that was not concerned with the constitutional aspects of the accountability doctrine and that it
was intended to be merely a statement of political reality and not a statement of binding
constitutional principle.
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Even assuming, however, that Justice Stevens’s statement in Chevron does, indeed,
amount to a statement of binding constitutional principle and that, by application of that principle
to inferior officers appointed under the Excepting Clause of the Appointments Clause, the
accountability doctrine does, indeed, apply to inferior officers serving within independent
agencies, then the issues in each such case would be, first, whether such officer is appointed by
persons who are indeed, in Professor Tribe’s words, “themselves not politically accountable”
and, second, if so, whether there is “ongoing supervision” of such official “by a politically
accountable official.”251
E.

The Burden of Persuasion
Alexander Bickel once argued that
when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act . . ., it thwarts
the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises
control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That, without
mystic overtones, is what actually happens. . . . [I]t is the reason the charge can be
made that judicial review is undemocratic.252

Because judicial review is thus inherently countermajoritarian, the courts have fashioned a
number of doctrines that have as their purpose the limiting of the exercise of judicial power and
that reflect “an underlying philosophy of judicial restraint.” Perhaps the most fundamental of
these doctrines is the “presumption of constitutionality,” under which
courts will presume a challenged statute is valid until it is demonstrated
otherwise. In other words, the party attacking the validity of the law carries the
burden of proof. This doctrine is based on an appreciation for the
countermajoritarian character of judicial review and a fundamental respect for the
legislative bodies in a democratic system.253
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Consistent with the presumption-of-constitutionality doctrine is one of the now famous
Ashwander Rules identified by Justice Louis D. Brandeis in 1936, which provides as follows:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided.254
Also consistent with both the presumption-of-constitutionality doctrine and Ashwander
Rule No. 7 is the judicially created distinction between “facial” constitutional challenges and
“as-applied” constitutional challenges.
The constitutionality of an act of Congress may be tested in either a “facial” challenge or
in an “as-applied” challenge.255 The Supreme Court has recently observed that the distinction
between the two types of constitutional challenges is “both instructive and necessary, for it goes
to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court.”256 The normal mode of constitutional
adjudication involves an as-applied challenge, in which a party argues that a statute cannot be
applied to him or her because its application would violate his or her constitutional rights.257 In a
facial challenge, the court is asked to vindicate a party’s right not to be bound by a statute that is
unconstitutional on its face, i.e., because its very enactment is inconsistent with some express
provision, or violates some express prohibition, of the Constitution.258 Within the customary
understanding of the distinction, facial attacks maintaining that a statute is generally invalid, as
opposed to invalid as applied to the challenger, have been considered “rare and suspect.”259 As
the Supreme Court has noted, “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult
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challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid.”260
IV.

The Free Enterprise Fund Case
This challenge to the constitutionality of the PCAOB started after the Board inspected a

small, regional accounting firm based in Nevada in 2004. Firms with less than 100 public
company audit clients are subject to PCAOB inspection at least every three years.261 This was
the firm’s first inspection by the PCAOB.
A.

Facts
Beckstead and Watts, LLP (“B&W” or the “Firm”) is a small accounting firm

headquartered in Henderson, Nevada.262 B&W is a “small ‘niche’ audit firm serving the needs
of ‘micro-cap’ and ‘development stage’ companies.”263 B&W is subject to PCAOB inspection
pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.264 A PCAOB inspection team conducted fieldwork in the
Nevada office of the Firm from May 17, 2004, through May 18, 2004.265 The inspection
involved a review of sixteen financial statement audits completed for B&W clients.266 The
PCAOB report provided that:
The inspection team identified matters that it considered to be audit deficiencies.
The deficiencies identified in eight of the audits reviewed included deficiencies of
such significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuers'
financial statements. Those deficiencies included –
(1) the failure to perform and document sufficient procedures to analyze the
appropriate accounting treatment for an acquisition of a rental property;
(2) the failure in two audits to perform and document sufficient procedures to
evaluate the recorded balance of capitalized software costs for impairment despite
260
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the presence of factors indicating potential impairment;
(3) the failure in three audits to perform and document sufficient procedures to
test the fair value of equity securities issued in several transactions;
(4) the failure in two audits to perform and document sufficient procedures to test
liabilities for completeness and accuracy;
(5) the failure to perform and document sufficient procedures to test the
appropriateness of the issuer's revenue recognition;
(6) the failure to perform and document sufficient procedures to test the valuation
of an expense recorded upon the termination of an agreement;
(7) the failure to perform and document sufficient procedures to test the
collectibility of a note receivable despite evidence of impairment; and
(8) the failure in two audits to perform and document an adequate evaluation with
respect to the issuers' ability to continue as a going concern.267
The PCAOB inspection team also evaluated the quality of the control system of B&W.268 Any
deficiencies in this portion of the report were, by rule, confidential and not to be reported to the
public for twelve months.269 In 2007, the PCAOB issued a clearance letter to the Firm
acknowledging that “the Firm [had] addressed the quality control criticisms or defects described
in the Board’s September 28, 2005 inspection report to the satisfaction of the Board.”270 This
letter meant that the Firm had made “good faith progress toward achieving . . . quality control
objectives”271 and that, consequently, the Board’s criticisms and any defects identified by the
Board would remain private.
Firms are allowed to review and comment on their PCAOB reports.272 In their response,
B&W characterized the PCAOB’s 2004 inspection as having been “overwhelming for [their]
small office.”273 The Firm acknowledged the inherent risk in micro-cap and developmental stage
companies but contended that investors knew this and would either “embrace [the] level of risk .
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. . or avoid it by investing their dollars elsewhere.”274 The Firm noted that many of its clients
had “going-concern” audit reports.275 Finally, the Firm addressed the costs of compliance with
SOX and distinguished their clients, which, it should be noted, traded on the Over-the-Counter
Bulletin Board Exchange,276 from Fortune 1000 companies. The Firm wrote, in part, that:
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) has tremendously impacted our firm’s
ability to compete in the small business issuer marketplace…. When the “Big
Four” accounting firms double their fees, their multi-national clients absorb the
costs; when we double our fees, our clients go out of business. It is thus a
constant struggle for us to perform audits in conformity with the requirements of
SOX. If the Board were to simply ignore these cost and efficacy issues, this
segment of the market likely will not be able to remain in existence.
. . . We found the inspectors evaluated our audits in the same manner one might
evaluate the audits of Fortune 1000 companies. . . .
[T]he SEC is and always has been aware of the micro-cap/development stage
market segment in which we work, and has allowed that segment to endure. It is
our belief that effectively eliminating that segment of the market should not be a
collateral consequence of the Board’s inspection process; rather, if anyone should
decide the fate of that segment of the market, it should be the SEC.277
B&W took action to respond to the PCAOB inspection and expectations. The 2007 clearance
letter is evidence of this action; however, as a result, B&W reduced its client base from over
sixty companies to approximately ten.278
The Firm was again inspected by the PCAOB in 2008, and a report was issued in 2009.279
This report was much more succinct than the 2005 report. The inspection involved the review of
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an audit for one issuer, and no audit performance issues were reported.280 As with the earlier
report, any control criticisms or defects were kept confidential. There was no comment from the
B&W in the 2009 report.
The Free Enterprise Fund281 (the “Fund”), a plaintiff in the case, “is a non-profit publicinterest organization under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. [The Fund]
promotes economic growth, lower taxes, and limited government through… advertising
campaigns…[and] policy guidance.”282 The identities of the members of the Fund are not
disclosed in any of the applicable pleadings or other court documents, although B&W is named
as a member of Fund in the opinion of the court of appeals.283
B.

Procedural History
1.

The District Court

On February 7, 2006, after the PCAOB’s 2004 inspection and investigation, B&W and
the Fund filed a complaint against the Board and four individuals in their capacities as members
of the PCAOB in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.284 The plaintiffs
presented a facial constitutional challenge285 to “the formation and operation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board,” asserting that the PCAOB provisions of SOX violate
both “the Constitution’s separation of powers principles and the Appointments Clause.” 286 The
plaintiffs argued that “[t]he Board’s exercise of wide-ranging, core executive power, immune
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from Presidential oversight, impermissibly impedes and undermines the President’s ability to
perform his constitutional duties and prerogatives. As a result, the creation of the Board, as well
as its implementation of its delegated responsibilities under the Act, violates the separation of
powers.”287 The plaintiffs also alleged that SOX improperly delegates legislative power outside
the Legislative Branch.288
With regard to the alleged violation of the Appointments Clause, the plaintiffs asserted
that members of the PCAOB are principal officers and, accordingly, must be appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. In the alternative, the plaintiffs
argued that members of the PCAOB are inferior officers that must be appointed by the President,
courts of law, or heads of departments. The plaintiffs contended further that the Securities and
Exchange Commission is not a department for purposes of the Appointments Clause.
Compounding the alleged violation of the Appointments Clause, the plaintiffs asserted, are
Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that the SEC consult with the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury and SOX’s
limitations on the number of Board members who may be appointed from the accounting
profession.289
The plaintiffs requested that the district court invalidate the PCAOB provisions of SOX
as unconstitutional and issue an injunction barring the PCAOB from any further proceedings
against B&W. Their prayer for relief also asked the court to nullify any prior adverse action by
the Board against B&W.290
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The defendants filed pre-trial motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint and, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. In their motions to dismiss, the defendants asserted a lack of
standing on the part of the plaintiffs and a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The defendants’
standing argument was based on several grounds, the most significant of which was that the
Fund had not alleged that it had sustained any specific injury. The defendants’ jurisdictional
argument also was based on numerous grounds, the most important of which was that the
plaintiffs had by-passed the exclusive process of review of the PCAOB’s actions prescribed by
SOX and had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. District Judge James Robertson
denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss but granted the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment. In a relatively short, unreported memorandum opinion, Judge Robertson initially
found that the defendants had essentially conceded the standing of B&W and that the Fund
likewise had standing because at least one of its members (B&W) was being regulated by the
PCAOB. Judge Robertson then concluded that the plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenges,
which targeted the very structure of the PCAOB, were collateral to SOX’s statutory scheme and
were, therefore, “outside the universe of cases subject to the implicitly exclusive administrative
review established by [SOX].”291
Addressing the cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Robertson noted that all the
parties had agreed that, for purposes of these motions, the PCAOB should be considered and
treated as a governmental entity.292 Then, relying heavily upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
Edmond, the court concluded that the members of the PCAOB are inferior officers because they
“‘have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do
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so by other executive officers,’ and are subject to administrative oversight and removal authority
by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.”293
The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers argument on the ground that
the Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution requires the President to maintain direct
removal power over inferior officers and that here, as in Morrison, the President has not been
“‘completely stripped’ of his ability to remove PCAOB members.”294 Finally, Judge Robertson
concluded that Congress had not, as alleged by the plaintiffs, unlawfully delegated legislative
power to the PCAOB in violation of Article I of the Constitution because SOX, in authorizing
regulation by the Board in the public interest, had properly prescribed intelligible standards that
the PCAOB is required to apply in exercising its regulatory powers.295
In ruling against the plaintiffs, Judge Robertson concluded his opinion by asserting that
they had presented “nothing but an [sic] hypothetical scenario of an over-zealous or rogue
PCAOB investigator.”296
2.

The Court of Appeals

The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s adverse decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,297 which affirmed, 2-1, the lower court’s ruling.298
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Circuit Judge Judith Rogers initially reviewed the lower court’s denial of the defendants’ motion
to dismiss and held that the district court had properly denied that motion. Because this was a
facial challenge of SOX, the circuit court reasoned, the plaintiffs’ failure to use the
administrative review procedures prescribed by SOX was not dispositive and thus the
“exhaustion doctrine [did] not apply.”299 Indeed, as the circuit court had held in Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC, a district court has “general federal question jurisdiction to consider a
facial challenge to a statute's constitutionality so long as that challenge is not raised in a suit
challenging the validity of agency action taken pursuant to the challenged statute or in a suit that
is collateral to one challenging the validity of such agency action.”300
Turning to the district court’s granting of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Judge Rogers relied upon Edmond to hold that the PCAOB members are inferior officers:
“Generally speaking, the term ‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some
higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an
‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior. Under this standard, the
Board is composed of officers inferior to the Commission. The Commissioners . .
. are “appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate,” and they exercise comprehensive control over Board procedures and
decisions and Board members. For instance, the Commission approves all Board
rules, and may abrogate, delete, or add to them. All Board sanctions are subject
to plenary review by the Commission, and the Commission “may enhance,
modify, cancel, reduce, or require the remission of a sanction imposed by the
Board.” As such, the Board’s disciplinary authority “ultimately belongs to the
[Commission], and the legal views of the [Board] must yield to the Commission’s
view of the law.” The Commission both appoints and removes Board members.
It also may impose limitations upon Board activities and relieve the Board of its
enforcement authority altogether.
. . . . Contrary to the Fund’s suggestion, the fact that the Board is charged with
exercising extensive authority on behalf of the United States does not mean that
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Board members must be appointed by the President, for principal as well as
inferior officers, by definition, “ ‘exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States.’” Instead, what is key under the Edmond analysis is the
fact that Board members “have no power to render a final decision on behalf of
the United States unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers. [SOX]
vests a broad range of duties in the Board, but its exercise of those duties is
subject to check by the Commission at every significant step.301
Moreover, the majority held, PCAOB members are subject to greater oversight than both the
Coast Guard judges in Edmond and the independent counsel in Morrison.302
Rejecting the Fund’s argument that the for-cause limitation on the Commission’s removal
power requires that Board members be deemed principal, rather than inferior, officers, the circuit
court observed that such a suggestion “overinflates the importance of removal authority”:
Recognizing that “[t]he power to remove officers . . . is a powerful tool for
control,” the Supreme Court has indicated that courts should consider removal
authority as one factor in determining whether an official is an inferior officer.
The Court has held that both the Coast Guard Judges in Edmond, who were
subject to the Judge Advocate General’s at-will removal authority, and the
Independent Counsel in Morrison, who was subject to removal only for cause,
were inferior officers. Here, [SOX] vests removal authority in the Commission,
providing that “[a] member of the Board may be removed by the Commission
from office . . . for good cause shown.” Just as in Morrison, “the fact that [Board
members] can be removed by the [Commission] indicates that [they are] to some
degree ‘inferior’ in rank and authority.”
The Supreme Court has expressly permitted legislatively-imposed limitations on
executive officers’ removal authority:
We have no doubt that when congress, by law, vests the
appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, it may
limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the
public interest. The constitutional authority in congress to thus
vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and
regulate the removal by such laws as congress may enact in
relation to the officers so appointed.303
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Responding to the assertion by the dissenting circuit judge that an officer removable only
for cause is ordinarily not “directed and supervised” for purposes of Edmond unless the statute
expressly provides either (1) that the officer can be removed for failing to follow a supervisor’s
direction and supervision, or (2) that a superior officer other than the President has authority to
manage—on a before-the-fact basis—the ongoing conduct of all of the officer’s exercises of
executive authority (such as conducting investigations and taking enforcement actions), Judge
Rogers noted that nothing in Edmond suggests that the appropriate supervisor’s direction and
supervision requires managing the officer’s ongoing conduct of every day-to-day function and
that, even under the dissenting judge’s suggested “novel” test, the PCAOB provisions of SOX
would survive scrutiny because the statute mandates that “all of the Board’s duties are ‘subject to
action by the Commission.’”304 As for the dissent’s position that the Board’s decisions
concerning inspections, investigations, and enforcement actions cannot be prevented,
affirmatively commanded, and managed by the Commission before such decisions are made, the
majority observed that, first, SOX requires the Board to inspect all registered public accounting
firms in accordance with a predetermined schedule that can be modified by the Board only by
rule pre-approved by the SEC (i.e., the Board does not have the discretion not to inspect any
particular firm) and to issue an inspection report, which is subject to SEC review at the request of
any inspected firm; second, SOX preserves the SEC’s own investigative authority and authorizes
the SEC not to affirmatively command an investigation by the Board, which means that the
Board may not usurp the SEC’s investigative authority; and third, “and most important,” because
the Board must establish by rule “fair procedures for the investigation and disciplining” of
accounting firms and individuals and because no such rule shall become effective without prior
SEC approval, the SEC is empowered by SOX to modify the Board’s investigative authority as it
304
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sees fit and may mandate “that all decisions regarding investigation or enforcement actions
against a firm be approved by the Commission.” Discounting the significance of dissent’s
distinction between managerial control exercised before the officer has taken an action and
managerial control exercised after the officer has acted, Judge Rogers emphasized that the
significant point is that, “‘[a]s in Edmond, any sanctions imposed by the Board are ‘subject to
review by the ‘Commission’ before the decisions t[ake] effect on the accused.’”305
The Circuit Court also rejected the Fund’s contention, even assuming that Board
members are inferior officers, that the SEC is not a department and the SEC commissioners are
not the “head” of such a department for purposes of the Excepting Clause of the Appointments
Clause. Judge Rogers noted that although no definition of “Heads of Departments” has yet been
provided, the Supreme Court has explained that the term “Departments” refers to “‘the
subdivision of the power of the Executive into departments, for the more convenient exercise of
that power’”; that “Departments” are “ ‘like the Cabinet-level departments’” but not limited to
cabinet-level departments; and that the four concurring justices in Freytag urged that the term be
understood to encompass “ ‘all agencies immediately below the President in the organizational
structure of the Executive Branch,’ including ‘all independent executive establishments.’”306
The majority of the circuit judges determined that the SEC is “Cabinet-like” because it exercises
“executive authority over a major aspect of government policy” and that, given the Supreme
Court’s acknowledgment in cases like Humphrey’s Executor of the constitutionality of
independent agencies like the FTC and the SEC, “such entities must be able to constitutionally
exercise appointment authority to permit their proper functioning.”307 Quoting with approval
from an Attorney General’s Opinion from 1933 concerning the Civil Service Commission, the
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majority opined that the SEC, too, is “ ‘not a subordinate Commission attached to one of the socalled executive departments but is in itself an independent division of the Executive Branch of
the Government with certain independent duties and functions’” and concluded that, as Congress
has authorized the SEC to appoint officers and employees, “it would be illogical to handicap its
ability to effectuate its statutory mandate because of the very independence that Congress has
deemed necessary and the Supreme Court has deemed constitutional.”308
The majority also determined that the SEC commissioners, as a group, collectively
exercise the same final authority as is vested in a single head of an executive department and
thus qualify as one of the “Heads of Departments” for Appointments Clause purposes.
Analogizing the SEC commissioners to the nine governors of the U. S. Postal Service (the
“USPS”) and relying upon a decision by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the
governors of the USPS constitute its “head” and that “ ‘Congress carefully vested ultimate
control and authority of the Postal Service in the Governors,’” the majority concluded that “[t]he
same is true here” and noted that the Fund had cited no authority suggesting that the framers of
the Constitution had intended to foreclose Congress from granting multi-member commissions
the authority to appoint inferior officers under the Excepting Clause of the Appointments
Clause.309 Hence, the Court of Appeals held that, because Board members are inferior officers
and because the SEC is a department whose head consists collectively of the SEC’s
commissioners, the provision of SOX authorizing the SEC commissioners to appoint the
members of the PCAOB does not violate the Appointments Clause.310
Addressing the separation-of-powers portion of the plaintiffs’ claim, the Court of Appeals
characterized that challenge not as an assertion that Congress or the federal judiciary had
308
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impermissibly encroached on the President’s appointment, removal, or decision-making
authority “by aggrandizing their own powers,” but rather as an argument that SOX had
impermissibly effected “an excessive attenuation of Presidential control over the Board”:
The crux of the Fund’s challenge – that the double for-cause limitation on
removal makes it impossible for the President to perform his duties – is a question
of first impression as neither the Supreme Court nor this court has considered a
situation where a restriction on removal passes through two levels of control. But
. . . [t]he removal power does not operate in a vacuum; rather it is one of several
criteria [identified by Morrison as] relevant to assessing limits on the President’s
ability to exercise Executive power.311
The Supreme Court, Judge Rogers noted, “has long recognized that some types of restrictions on
Presidential authority within the Executive Branch are permissible, especially in the case of
independent agencies.”312 In Morrison, for instance, the Court had determined that “ ‘the real
question [is] whether . . . the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty’ to ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed’ was impeded” and had concluded that, in the light of the
Attorney General’s ability to remove the independent counsel for cause, her limited jurisdiction
and tenure, and her lack of policy-making authority, congressional “restrictions on the ‘amount
of control or supervision’ that the President ultimately exercised over the functions of the
Independent Counsel were constitutional given the ‘several means of supervising or controlling
the . . . powers that may be wielded.’”313
The dual for-cause feature of the removal provisions applicable to Board members under
SOX are entirely consistent with Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison, the Court of Appeals held.
The nature and extent of the controls exercised by the SEC over the Board and the President’s
ability to remove SEC commissioners for cause, the court concluded, do not mean that the
President’s ability to carry out his Executive responsibilities are unconstitutionally restricted.
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“When assessed in the context of the restrictions on Presidential power upheld in Morrison,” the
court averred, “the President’s powers under [SOX] extend comfortably beyond the minimum
required to ‘perform his constitutionally assigned duties.’ Although the President does not
directly select or supervise the Board’s members, the President possesses significant influence
over the Commission, which in turn possesses comprehensive control over the Board.” Thus
rejecting the plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers challenge “[b]ecause of the reality of the
President’s broad-ranging authority under [SOX],” the Court of Appeals observed that “the bulk
of the Fund’s challenge to [SOX] was fought—and lost—over seventy years ago when the
Supreme Court decided Humphrey’s Executor.”314
Dissenting Court of Appeals Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh’s view of the case and approach
to the constitutional issues were diametrically opposed to those of the majority. “This case,”
Judge Kavanaugh declared, “is Humphrey’s Executor squared. There is a world of difference
between the legion of Humphrey’s Executor-style agencies and the PCAOB: The heads of the
Humphrey’s Executor independent agencies are removable for cause by the President, whereas
members of the PCAOB are removable for cause only by another independent agency, the
Securities and Exchange Commission.” Thus characterizing the PCAOB as a discrete
“independent executive agency,” presumably separate and apart from and independent of the
SEC, Judge Kavanaugh focused upon the removal power as a significant tool of control:
The President’s power to remove is critical to the President’s power to control the
Executive Branch and perform his Article II responsibilities. Yet under this
statute, the President is two levels of for-cause removal away from Board
members, a previously unheard-of restriction on and attenuation of the President’s
authority over executive officers. This structure effectively eliminates any
Presidential power to control the PCAOB, notwithstanding that the Board
performs numerous regulatory and law-enforcement functions at the core of the
executive power. . . . [N]ever before in American history has there been an
independent agency whose heads are appointed by and removable only for cause
314
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by another independent agency, rather than by the President or his alter ego. But
that is the case with the PCAOB members, who are removable for cause only by
the SEC—and it is undisputed that the SEC as an independent agency is not the
President’s alter ego. The PCAOB thus goes well beyond what historical practice
and Humphrey’s Executor authorize.315
Judge Kavanaugh also attempted to distinguish the PCAOB case from existing Supreme
Court precedent on the ground that here, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the removal power
has been effectively and completely stripped from the President. Moreover, according to
Kavanaugh, the members of the PCAOB are not inferior officers, but principal officers who must
be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.316
Although not addressing the “Heads of Departments” issue directly,317 Judge Kavanaugh
attempted to rebut the majority’s characterization in discussing the control aspect of the
Appointments Clause issue, writing:
None of the . . . authorities [cited by the Board] gives the SEC power to prevent
and affirmatively command, and to manage the ongoing conduct of, Board
inspections, investigations, and enforcement actions… After-the-fact judicial or
quasi-judicial review of enforcement decisions following an investigation does
315
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note remotely equate to direction and supervision for purposes of Edmond . . . .
[T]he SEC’s exercising, taking over, or limiting the Board’s responsibilities does
not amount to directing and supervising the PCAOB.318
In his consideration of the plaintiffs’ challenge of the PCAOB provisions of SOX under the
Appointments Clause, Judge Kavanaugh read Edmond as establishing a two-part test and as
mandating that an officer who is removable only for cause is ordinarily not “directed and
supervised” for purposes of Edmond “at least unless (1) the statute expressly provides that the
officer can be removed for failing to follow a supervisor’s direction and supervision, or (2) the
statute expressly provides that a superior officer other than the President has authority to prevent
and affirmatively command, and to manage the ongoing conduct of, all of the officer's exercises
of executive authority against the public (such as conducting investigations and taking
enforcement actions).” Applying such an analysis to this case, Kavanaugh concluded that
PCAOB members are principal officers and that because they are not appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the PCAOB provisions of SOX are
unconstitutional.319
Responding to the majority’s observation that the plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers
challenge was not that Congress or the federal judiciary had impermissibly encroached on the
President’s appointment, removal, or decision-making authority by aggrandizing their own
powers but that SOX had impermissibly effected an excessive attenuation of Presidential control
over the Board, Judge Kavanaugh noted that such a distinction is “not an entirely accurate
summary of separation of powers principles” and quoted from a decision in 1996 by Justice
Anthony Kennedy to the effect that “[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself, . . .
the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of

318
319

PCAOB II, 537 F. 3d at 709-710 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).
Id. at 709.

74
its constitutional duties.”320 Kavanaugh went on to assert his view that SOX’s restriction on the
President’s removal power over the PCAOB is unconstitutional under both Humphrey’s
Executor and Morrison, primarily on the grounds that, unlike the facts in either of those cases,
“neither the President nor a Presidential alter ego can remove the members of the PCAOB” and
that, contrary to the dictates of Morrison, this is a case in which the power to remove an
executive official has been completely stripped from the President, “ ‘thus providing no means
for the President to ensure the “faithful execution” of the laws.’”321 Concluding that SOX
impermissibly attenuates the President’s removal power over the PCAOB, Kavanaugh declared:
Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison represent what up to now have been the
outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions on the
President's removal power. Therefore, given a choice between drawing the line at
the holdings in Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison or extending those cases to
authorize novel structures such as the PCAOB that further attenuate the
President’s control over executive officers, we should opt for the former. We
should resolve questions about the scope of those precedents in light of and in the
direction of the constitutional text and constitutional history.322
In a final section of his dissenting opinion, Judge Kavanaugh noted that “from an
accountability perspective, the whole of this statute is worse than the sum of its parts because
neither the President nor his alter ego has any role in the appointment of Board members or in
the removal of Board members.” Each of these problems, Kavanaugh maintained, compounds
the other. Quoting a passage from Professor Laurence H. Tribe, the dissenting court of appeals
judge emphasized the accountability problem with “this kind of structure”:
[I]n the particular situation in which an inferior officer is appointed by persons
who are themselves not politically accountable . . . ongoing supervision by a
politically accountable official, whether by the President or by someone serving at
the President’s pleasure, seems particularly important. In such circumstances,
where there is little or no political accountability at the front end for the choice of
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that officer, a ‘for cause’ limitation on removal that renders political supervision
impossible appears troubling from an accountability perspective.323
“Even assuming,” Judge Kavanaugh concluded, “that the statutory scheme structuring the
PCAOB is an effective means to regulate the accounting industry, ‘that a given law or procedure
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.’”324
C.

The Proceedings before the Supreme Court of the United States
The Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead Watts filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,325

which the Supreme Court granted in May 2009. Several questions were presented to the Court
and are as follows:
1. Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 violates the Constitution's
separation of powers by vesting members of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") with far-reaching executive power while completely
stripping the President of all authority to appoint or remove those members or
otherwise supervise or control their exercise of that power, or whether, as the
court of appeals held, the Act is constitutional because Congress can restrict the
President's removal authority in any way it "deems best for the public interest."
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, under the Appointments
Clause, PCAOB members are "inferior officers" directed and supervised by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), where the SEC lacks any
authority to supervise those members personally, to remove the members for any
policy- related reason or to influence the members' key investigative functions,
merely because the SEC may review some of the members' work product.
3. If PCAOB members are inferior officers, whether the Act's provision for
their appointment by the SEC violates the Appointments Clause either because
the SEC is not a "Department" under Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868
(1991), or because the five commissioners, acting collectively, are not the "Head"
of the SEC.326
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A review of the parties’ briefs and the transcript of oral argument before the Supreme Court in
December 2009 reveals that the parties employ differing interpretations of the applicable
precedent to resolve these questions. The lack of clear standards provided by the Court’s prior
decisions is a factor in the dissimilar arguments set forth by the parties in support of their
positions in the appeal.
1.

The Appointments Clause Issues

a.

Principal or Inferior Officers?

The crux of the Free Enterprise Fund case is the claim that SOX violates the
Appointments Clause, which the Supreme Court has recognized “is among the significant
structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.”327
The petitioners have claimed that Board members are principal officers328 and that the
supervision described in Edmond is absent for Board members. They argue that Presidential
removal power is necessary for the “effective discipline” of inferior officers and that, secondly,
supervision requires “day-to-day oversight.”329 Both are absent here, the petitioners contend.
Moreover, the petitioners claim:
in addition to determining whether an officer has a superior, the Court must look
to the nature of the office and its duties, asking whether the officer enjoys broad
authority to “formulate policy” in a permanent office with statutory authority, or
rather is “empowered… to perform only certain, limited duties,” in an office
“limited in tenure.”330
When viewed by this standard, the petitioners contend, Board members clearly are principal
officers because they are independent and autonomous, possess policy-making authority, and
circumvent the usual congressional appropriations process. Moreover, the petitioners argue, the
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PCAOB was created by SOX expressly as an independent agency, and, as such, “the heads of all
agencies or quasi-governmental corporations are appointed by the President with Senate
confirmation.”331 The Board is its own independent agency, the petitioners argue, so the
Appointments Clause should apply to the Board’s members as principal officers.
Conversely, both respondents rely on Edmond to argue just the opposite: that Board
members are inferior officers.332 The Board, for instance, asserts that
[t]he standard for distinguishing principal from inferior officers is clear. Under
Edmond… “[w]hether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a
superior.” Consequently, “‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed
and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Here, Board members are
comprehensively “directed and supervised” by the presidentially appointed
Commissioners of the SEC.333
This supervision includes, but is not limited to, de novo review by the SEC of any disciplinary
action taken by the Board, the SEC’s ability to rescind the Board’s authority, and the
Commission’s rule-approval procedures and informal supervision.334 Having the authority to
supervise and control is enough, the respondents contend; that the SEC does not actually exercise
its authority does not mean that the SEC does not have such authority.335 Is, however, the SEC’s
authority over Board functions the same as at-will removal over Board members? The court of
appeals and the respondents answered in the affirmative.336 In response to a question from
Justice Anthony Kennedy during oral argument before the Court in December 2009, Solicitor
General Elena Kagan noted that
the statutory scheme and structure makes it clear that the SEC has comprehensive
authority not just over the rulemaking, but over the investigative and inspection
331

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 328, at 50.
See Brief for PCAOB at 15; Brief for United States, at 29-30.
333
Brief for PCAOB at 15 (citing Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662-663) (citation omitted).
334
See PCAOB Rule 5206; Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 106 (d)(1), 107 (b); Brief for United States at 27.
335
See Brief for PCAOB at 24 (“oversight powers… enable control by their existence, not just their exercise”).
336
PCAOB II at 30; Brief for United States at 28.
332

78
activities of the board; that no – no sanction arising from an investigation can be
issued except if the board agrees; that no inspection report can be issued, except if
the . . . the SEC agrees.
And further, as I said before, that the SEC can reach further back into the process
and say, not only do we have this kind of veto authority over any sanction that
comes out of an investigation or over any report that comes out of an inspection,
but we can also change the way those inspections and investigations are
conducted in the first place.337
Also, during oral argument, counsel for the petitioners attempted to minimize the SEC’s
statutory authority to rescind the Board’s authority to investigate and inspect and to distinguish
between the SEC’s authority to restrict before-the-fact action by the Board and the
Commission’s authority to review and rescind proposed Board action after-the-fact. “If I relieve
my associate of the responsibility to give me a brief tomorrow, I haven’t told him he can’t do it,”
counsel argued. “Don’t . . . you think that’s what it means, though, realistically?” Justice Scalia
responded, “When you no longer have responsibility to perform a . . . governmental act, you no
longer have the authority to perform it.”338
Following this exchange, Justice Kennedy asked counsel for the petitioners, “What other
harms or dangers or risks are inherent in the power of the Board unmonitored, unchecked by the
SEC, to investigate?” Counsel responded, “The burden here is the burden that Mr. Olson
suffered in Morrison v. Olson. He was never indicted. There was [sic] never any sanctions
subject to review. But he was subject to a burdensome investigation and that is the burden that
affects American citizens that is beyond the review of the SEC.”339
Additionally, the PCAOB challenges the petitioners’ assertion that prohibiting for-cause
removal of Board members makes them de facto principal officers. Perkins held that the
removal of inferior officers could indeed be limited, and the respondents highlighted that
337
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Edmond had intimated that removal is not the only method of supervision: “while ‘[t]he power
to remove officers * * * is a powerful tool for control,’ it is not the only such tool.”340
b.

Is the SEC a Department?

Even if the Board members are found to be inferior officers, does SOX still violate the
Appointments Clause because the SEC is not a “Department” or because the SEC’s
commissioners are not, collectively, the “Head” of a department? The SEC is not directly
accountable to the President, petitioners allege, because the President does not have the authority
to remove the SEC’s commissioners at will and because the commissioners together do not
constitute a department’s “Head.”341
The United States countered:
Treating the Commissioners as the SEC’s “Head” therefore is much more natural
than saying that the SEC has no “Head,” or that its “Head” is a person in whom
Congress has not vested the agency’s final decision-making authority. See Silver
v. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Postal
Service is a “Department” under the Appointments Clause, and its nine Governors
collectively constitute the “Head” for appointment purposes); Authority of Civil
Serv. Comm’n to Appoint a Chief Examiner, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 231 (1933)
(opining that the three commissioners of the Civil Service Commission
collectively served as “the ‘head of a Department’ in the constitutional sense”);
cf. Classification Act of 1923, ch. 265, § 2, 42 Stat. 1488 (“ ‘the head of the
department’ means the officer or group of officers in the department who are not
subordinate or responsible to any other officer of the department”) (emphasis
added).342
Moreover, the government noted, the Court has long construed the Appointments Clause to
permit a person other than the agency head (here, for the sake of argument, the SEC’s
commissioners) to appoint an inferior officer so long as the appointment is made with the
approval or approbation of the agency head (presumably, again for the sake of argument, in those
cases when the chairman, who is also an SEC commissioner, votes with a majority of the
340
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commissioners to appoint a particular Board member).343 While petitioners used the
Reorganization Act of 1949344 to show that the chairman exercised significant authority, the
Commission, collectively, the government noted, was given control over Board appointments
under SOX, which is consistent with other existing rulemaking and enforcement authority of the
SEC.345
The petitioners interpret Freytag to mean that appointments under the Excepting Clause
must go to those “directly answerable” to the President, so that any holding otherwise by the
Court would overrule that precedent.346 The independent agencies are “part of the Executive
Branch,” the respondents counter.347 Moreover, emphasized the respondent, the Chairman is
accountable to the President, though the petitioners are not satisfied with that. Finally, the
petitioners charge that if the Chairman were not the “Head” of the SEC, then all inferior officer
appointments within the SEC made by the Chairman alone rather than by the whole Commission
(limited, in fact, to certain staff members) would be unconstitutional,348 to which the respondents
reply, “But those staff members are not appointed ‘by the Chairman alone.’ . . . ‘[T]he
appointment[s] by the Chairman of the heads of major administrative units under the
Commission [are] subject to the approval of the Commission.”349 During oral argument, this
exchange between counsel for the petitioners and Justice Scalia, captured that idea:
MR. CARVIN: [I]f you accept their view of who the head of the department is,
343
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which is the commission -JUSTICE SCALIA: All those appointments are presumably invalid.
MR. CARVIN: -- all those appointments are unconstitutional, so under their
theory -JUSTICE SCALIA: That would be a shame.350
2. The Separation of Powers Issues
The principle of “separation of powers… is at the heart of our Constitution.”351 The
Constitution vests power in three separate branches of government and allocates power among
the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary.352 The power of the Executive over the
PCAOB is one of the principal issues at hand in the Free Enterprise Fund case.
The petitioners allege that the power of the Executive has been encroached upon by
Congress with the creation of the PCAOB.353 The creation of the Board, however, was a
congressional response to increasing demand from the public for reform, especially during the
post-Enron, post-WorldCom period. Moreover, the Center for Audit Quality (the “CAQ”), as
amicus curiae, has urged the Court to consider the purpose that Congress attempted to serve
when it created the PCAOB. Even comments by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg during oral
argument in the case allude to the need for the Board. Indeed, during the rebuttal by counsel for
the petitioners, Justice Ginsburg commented that “[t]here is a problem that Congress had to
solve. It wanted to tighten the oversight of the auditing function.”354 The amicus brief355
elaborates this perspective for the Court. Instead of supporting the respondent’s constitutional
350
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arguments, the CAQ emphasizes the PCAOB’s role in the markets as a compelling reason for
upholding the legitimacy of the PCAOB. The CAQ notes that
PCAOB inspections have improved audit quality in a number of ways. . . . .
Moreover, the PCAOB’s oversight of the profession brings with it stability and
predictability that is beneficial to both the investing public and the audit
profession. The profession appreciates the benefits that a tough but fair, wellinformed and appropriately focused regulator can bring to audit quality, and
recognizes that an entity charged with audit regulation provides corresponding
benefits to investors.356
By enacting SOX, petitioners claim, Congress has completely “circumvent[ed]… basic
controls on governmental power…by, for the first time in our Nation’s history, vesting this
potentially tyrannical authority in a purportedly private ‘corporation’ whose members are not
‘officer[s]… or agent[s of] the Federal Government.’”357 Moreover, they argue that the statute
impedes the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty to carry out the laws of the
United States.358 The petitioners contend that “this is quite a simple case because (i) the
President has no ability to control or supervise Board members, (ii) Congress has at least
equivalent ability to influence the Board, and (iii) there is no legitimate justification, let alone an
‘overriding need,’ for this intrusion.”359 By this, the petitioners mean that the President has no
“at-will” removal authority, no authority via an “alter ego,” and no direct or indirect influence
over Board action.360 Congress, they argue, even impermissibly retains control over the removal
of Board members since it has, in effect, an ultimate “veto power over any Board member’s
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removal” in the form of denying confirmation of new SEC Commissioners who might be
nominated by the President for the purpose of firing Board members:361
Upholding the Board here would therefore plainly authorize Congress to reduce
the President to the largely symbolic and hortatory role of appointing bipartisan
independent commissioners who, in turn, would appoint independent board
members who do the actual governing but could not be removed or supervised by
the President in any circumstance, and where any indirect removal effort would
necessarily involve the Senate’s participation. This arrangement cannot
reasonably be squared with the Constitution’s plain language and is precisely the
unaccountable plural executive that the Framers expressly rejected because it
would both place the executive under the thumb of Congress and place citizens
under the thumb of unelected functionaries. If the Constitution’s express vesting
of the “executive power” in the President, and the Court’s consistent endorsement
of the Constitution’s liberty-enhancing separated powers, are anything more than
meaningless rhetoric, the Act’s complete separation of the executive power from
the Executive must be patently unconstitutional.362
The government, in response, relies on Humphrey’s Executor as having established the
constitutional sufficiency of the President’s control over independent agencies as settled law for
more than seventy years.363 Moreover, respondent United States argues, the Court has long
recognized since well before Perkins that Congress clearly has the authority to restrict the
President’s power to remove inferior officers when the power to appoint such officers is vested
in the head of a department or in the courts of law under the Excepting Clause.364 Hence, the
Appointments Clause actually contemplates the attenuation of Presidential power to control and
supervise (and ultimately, Presidential accountability) because “the power of removal is incident
to the power of appointment.”365
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The United States further notes that petitioners do not dispute the constitutionality either
of independent agencies, which has been well established since Humphrey’s Executor,366 or of
the SEC, which apparently has never seriously been questioned since the Supreme Court
declined to address the constitutionality of the Securities Act of 1933 in 1936.367 Additionally,
respondent PCAOB argues that Congress, in fact, has less control than suggested by the
petitioners because SOX actually places the PCAOB outside the congressional budget and
appropriation process.368
The issue of removal is vital to the discussion of the separation-of-powers argument. The
Petitioners allege that SOX violates the Morrison two-part test, which, according to the
petitioners, is “whether the restriction on Presidential removal ‘by itself’ impermissibly prevents
his ‘control [and] supervision’ and, if not, whether the Act, ‘taken as a whole,’ does.369 SOX
prevents “at-will” removal of Board members; instead, the SEC can only remove Board
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members “for cause.”370 This limitation is, petitioners argue, too restrictive and impermissibly
limits the President’s control. This limitation is further complicated because there are two levels
of for-cause removal, which according to the petitioners effectively removes the President from
exercising control over the Board. Indeed, as Judge Kavanaugh wrote in his dissent:
But this case is Humphrey’s Executor squared. . . . [U]nder this statute, the
President is two levels of for-cause removal away from Board members, a
previously unheard-of restriction on and attenuation of the President’s authority
over executive officers. This structure effectively eliminates any Presidential
power to control the PCAOB.371
According to the government, however, “the Court observed in Morrison . . . with respect
to an inferior officer, ‘we cannot say that the imposition of a ‘good cause’ standard for removal
by itself unduly trammels on executive authority.”372 In addition to violating the “two-part test,”
the petitioners further argue that, of course, in Morrison there was a need to have restrictions on
the President’s removal power, since the independent counsel was investigating alleged
wrongdoing within the Executive Branch. That is, they argue, not the situation in the case at
hand.373 Interestingly, the PCAOB argues that the President’s overall control in the traditional
sense of chain-of-command authority, and not removal alone, should be the focus of the Court’s
inquiry and that, in the light of SOX’s grant to the SEC of “multiple powers that are equivalent
to at-will removal authority,” SOX “does not unconstitutionally restrict the President’s
traditional chain-of-command authority” because the SEC controls “each and every exercise of
the Board’s authority” and “SOX does not diminish the President’s authority over the SEC in the
slightest.”374 Moreover, the PCAOB argues, the “removal-follows-appointment rationale does
not depend on whether the department head is removable for cause or at will. The department
370
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head must be sufficiently accountable to the President that the department is, in fact, a
‘department’ capable of appointing inferior officers. . . . But neither the Constitution nor
precedent supports a further requirement that the department head be removable at will.”375
Wholly apart from the legal issues here is Justice Scalia’s well-known hostility towards
Humphrey’s Executor,376 as evidenced by this exchange at oral argument:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . Humphrey's Executor says you can limit the
President's removal power. That doesn't get you down to the board. You have to
also say the principal officers, there can be limits on their removal authority of the
board members.
GENERAL KAGAN: I -- I understand the temptation to say something like, well,
we don't really much like Humphrey's Executor, but we are stuck with it, but not
an inch further.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I didn't say anything bad about Humphrey's
Executor.
(Laughter.)
GENERAL KAGAN: But -- but -JUSTICE SCALIA: I did, I did.
(Laughter.)
GENERAL KAGAN: But this in fact -JUSTICE SCALIA: We did overrule it, by the way, in -- in Morrison, didn't we?377
V.

Analysis of the Free Enterprise Fund Case
As of the date of the submission of this paper in early May 2010, the Supreme Court has

not issued a decision in the Free Enterprise Fund case, and there is no realistic way of predicting
what result the Court might reach when its decision is announced.

375

Id. at 42 (building on Hennen’s removal-follows-appointment principle).
STAAB, supra note 205, at 62-63.
377
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-43.
376

87
It is possible, however, to anticipate the possible analytical approaches that the Court
might employ. This section addresses those approaches and, when appropriate, suggests which
of those approaches the Court is likely to take.378
There are several questions to be answered by the Court. Precedent has laid the
foundation for principal/inferior officer status and the definition of a “Department,” but the
parties have interpreted the cases quite differently. Ultimately, it is up to the Court to decide the
issues and determine the constitutionality of the PCAOB.
It seems evident that the SEC does not have the resources or interest to promulgate
auditing standards. Indeed, the SEC has historically vested the setting of accounting standards in
the private sector (i.e., FASB, AICPA).379 Now, subsequent to the scandals at Enron and other
firms, the government has increased authority over the audit function. Therefore, accountability
has been increased since this oversight was removed from the private sector. The
constitutionality of this transfer, however, is at stake in the Free Enterprise Fund case.
It should be kept in mind that this is a facial challenge brought by the petitioners. Facial
constitutional challenges are not favored by the courts, and the petitioners should have to satisfy
a substantial burden of persuasion in order to prevail in the Supreme Court.380
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A.

Appointments Clause Issues
1.

Principal/Inferior Officers Question

Foremost, the Court will need to resolve the issue of the principal/inferior officer status
of Board members.381 Will the Court establish a definition for officer status? Most likely not,
but the Court ultimately should use Edmond or Morrison to decide this Appointments Clause
issue.
Board members are subject to removal by a higher Executive authority (i.e., the SEC),
and, arguably, the PCAOB has limited jurisdiction (i.e., the auditing of public companies).
Furthermore, Board members are term-limited.382 Hence, applying three of the Morrison
criteria, the Court should conclude that PCAOB members are inferior officers. The Court might
very well conclude, however, that the final criterion of Morrison—whether the officers have
limited duties—is not present because the Board performs a policy-making function and has both
investigatory and enforcement authority. Are the functions of the PCAOB quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial in the same sense that the Court in Humphrey’s Executor concluded that the FTC
performed? While Justice Scalia might like the opportunity presented by the Free Enterprise
Fund case to overturn Humphrey’s Executor,383 the assumption is that he will be unable to
persuade four other members of the Court to join him in doing so384 and that the Court’s decision
in the earlier case will continue to serve as applicable precedent in this case. If so, then the
PCAOB facts provide support for answering this question in the affirmative. The WCC
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members in Wiener, for instance, were deemed to be inferior officers who performed not purely
executive functions, but quasi-judicial functions, and they did not even answer to a higher review
or supervisory authority. Conversely, PCAOB members are subject to comprehensive oversight
and review by the SEC and, hence, the likelihood that Board members will be characterized as
inferior officers is even stronger than was the case with respect to the WCC members in Wiener.
Finally, are Board members sufficiently supervised and controlled to satisfy Edmond? In
Edmond, of course, the Judge Advocate General was authorized to remove a CGCCA judge from
his judicial assignment at will, or without cause,385 and the Judge Advocate General presumably
was removable without cause by the Secretary of Transportation, who himself was removable by
the President without cause whereas in the Free Enterprise Fund case, the SEC only has the
authority to remove PCAOB members and only for cause. Is that distinction significant for
purposes of the Appointments Clause? The Court in Edmond seems to have indicated that it was
not. For although the Judge Advocate General was authorized to remove a CGCCA judge from
his or her judicial assignment, the Court noted that the Judge Advocate General’s control over
the CGCCA was “not complete” and that the power to reverse decisions of the CGCCA was
vested in another Executive Branch entity, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.386 The
removal power, however, was not in itself determinative of the question of whether CGCCA
judges were inferior or principal officers. “What is significant,” the Edmond Court emphasized,
“is that the judges of the [CGCCA] have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the
United States unless permitted to do so by other executive officers.”387 Moreover, in holding
385
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some six decades earlier that the FTC Act’s provision that “any commissioner may be removed
by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” permissibly limits the
President’s authority to remove FTC commissioners to these causes only, i.e., for cause, the
Court in Humphrey’s Executor specifically sanctioned the restriction to “for cause” of the
President’s power to remove the member of an independent agency for separation-of-powers
purposes.388
Moreover, the Court in Morrison observed that, with respect to an inferior officer, “we
cannot say that the imposition of ‘good cause’ standard for removal by itself unduly trammels on
executive authority.”389
Relying upon Edmond, the PCAOB in the Free Enterprise Fund case argues that the
determination of the issue of whether Board members are inferior or principal officers does not
turn on removal alone and that, in any event, the SEC’s comprehensive control over the PCAOB
constitutes the “equivalent” of at-will removal power.390 Although there does not appear to be
any legal precedent for the latter proposition, the former argument seems to be the better view.
Just as with the judges of the CGCCA, whom the Court in Edmond concluded were inferior
officers, there is with respect to the PCAOB a superior Executive Branch entity—the SEC—that
is similar to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (and ultimately the Supreme Court) with
respect to the CGCCA and that supervises the work of the PCAOB, with power to determine its
procedural rules, to remove any member of the PCAOB for cause, and to order any adjudicative
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decision by the Board submitted for review.391 As the Court of Appeals in Free Enterprise Fund
concluded,
[SOX] subjects Board members to greater supervision than the Coast Guard
judges in Edmond, whom the Supreme Court held to be inferior officers even
though supervision of the judges was fractured between two different bodies, and
their decisions were not subject to de novo review. Contrary to the Fund’s
suggestion, the fact that the Board is charged with exercising extensive authority
on behalf of the United States does not mean that Board members must be
appointed by the President, for principal as well as inferior officers, by definition,
‘exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.’”
Indeed, what is key under the Edmond analysis is the fact that Board members
“have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless
permitted to do so by other Executive officers. [SOX] vests a broad range of
duties in the Board, but its exercise of those duties is subject to check by the
Commission at every significant step.392
Hence, wholly apart from the PCAOB’s “equivalency” argument, the Court in the Free
Enterprise Fund case should conclude that the members of the PCAOB are inferior,
rather than principal, officers.
2.

Department Question

In deciding Freytag, the Court did not provide a definition for what constitutes a
Department for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Freytag indicated “that the term ‘Departments’ means all independent executive establishments .
. .[, and] there is no reason, in text, judicial decision, history, or policy, to limit the phrase “the
Heads of Departments” in the Appointments Clause to those officials who are members of the
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President’s Cabinet.”393 Yet, during oral argument, Justice Scalia commented to counsel to the
petitioners that, “I hope your case doesn’t rest on Freytag.”394
If it is determined that the SEC is a department, the Court must also consider whether,
acting together as one, the commissioners of the SEC are the “Head” of the department. Silver is
judicial precedent supporting this concept. Moreover, the fact that all but the most basic of
administrative functions are subject to Commission approval is solid support for holding that the
Commission, collectively, is the “Head.”
B.

Separation-of-Powers Issues
In her opinion in the Court of Appeals decision, Judge Rogers described the “crux” of the

Free Enterprise Fund case as the double for-cause limitation on the President’s removal power,
which “makes it impossible for the President to perform his [constitutional] duties.”395 During
oral argument before the Court, the following exchange occurred between Solicitor General
Kagan and Chief Justice Roberts:
GENERAL KAGAN: The ultimate constitutional question is the level of
presidential control, and the presidential control here is exactly the same with
respect to the board's activities as it is with respect to the SEC staff's activities.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, no, no, because you have got an extra layer
there. Let's say, I mean, that you have to have two violations of the for-cause
provision. You have got to have -- you have to meet the requirement in two
places. When the SEC wants to remove the board member, they can only do that
for cause. And if they decide, well, there isn't cause; I'm not going to do it, then
the President under your theory has to remove the SEC commissioners, all of
them, not just -- not just the chairman, and he can only do that for cause.
So you have got “for cause” squared, and that's -- that's a significant
limitation that Humphrey's Executor didn't recognize and Morrison didn't
recognize.396
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The issue presented by the double for-cause limitation on the President’s removal power
is, as Judge Rogers noted in her opinion for the Court of Appeals, one of “first
impression”397 in that the Supreme Court has to date not been faced a restriction on
removal that passes through two levels of control. Because of these two levels of control,
neither Morrison nor Edmond is directly applicable. In both Morrison and Edmond, there
was “flow-through” Executive control in the form of removal power.

In Morrison, the

independent counsel was removable by Attorney General, a cabinet-level officer, who
was removable at will by the President. Similarly, in Edmond, the Secretary of
Transportation, also a cabinet-level officer, was removable at will by the President, and
the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces are removable by
the President for cause.398 In both Morrison and Edmond, a cabinet-level officer who
was removable at will by the President exercised either oversight or removal control.
That is what makes the Free Enterprise Fund case different from both Morrison and
Edmond—in the Free Enterprise Fund case, only the SEC, whose commissioners are
removable by the President only for cause, stands between the President and the Board
(i.e., there is no “flow through” control by the President over the Board). The question
that is presented here is whether the absence of “flow-through” control is sufficient for
separation-of-powers purposes. The parties’ differing characterizations of Morrison and
Edmond probably arise because this case is not conclusively governed by either of those
cases.
If one juxtaposes the holding in Humphrey’s Executor, which found for-cause
removal control to be sufficient for independent agencies, with the preceding analysis, the
397
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absence of “flow-through” control might well be found to constitute sufficient
Presidential control over the Board.
C.

Accountability Issue
Justice Stevens’s observation in Chevron that administrative “agencies are not directly

accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is” 399 constitutes, as had been noted merely a
statement of political reality, not a constitutional principle. Even assuming, however, that Justice
Stevens’s statement does, indeed, amount to a statement of binding constitutional principle and
that, by application of that principle to inferior officers appointed under the Excepting Clause of
the Appointments Clause, the accountability doctrine does, indeed, apply to such officers serving
within independent agencies, then the issues in each such case would be, first, whether such
officer is appointed by persons who are indeed, in Professor Tribe’s words, “themselves not
politically accountable” and, second, if so, whether there is “ongoing supervision” of such
official “by a politically accountable official.”400
Here, given the President’s ability to remove SEC commissioners (including the
chairman) for cause, which appears to have been sanctioned by both Humphrey’s Executor and
Morrison, the answer to Processor Tribe’s first question seems to be that the PCAOB members
are appointed and removable by persons—the SEC commissioners—who are politically
accountable to the President. Moreover, in the light of the comprehensive non-removal controls
over the PCAOB exercised by the SEC, the answer to Tribe’s second question seems to be that
there is, indeed, ongoing supervision of Board members by politically accountable officials.
Hence, the Court should resolve any political accountability issues in favor of the PCAOB.
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D.

Severability Issue
Commentators have suggested that if the PCAOB is declared unconstitutional, then the

remainder of SOX will be invalidated because of the absence of a severability provision in the
statute. As the Supreme Court has noted, however,
The unconstitutionality of a part of an act does not necessarily defeat or affect the
validity of its remaining provisions. Unless it is evident that the Legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left
is fully operative as a law . . . [The] invalidity of any part of the act shall not in
any manner affect the remaining portions. That discloses an intention to make the
act divisible, and creates a presumption that, eliminating invalid parts, the
Legislature would have been satisfied with what remained, and that the scheme of
regulation derivable from the other provisions would have been enacted without
regard to [the invalid power].401
Hence, even the absence of a severability provision in SOX would not necessarily result in the
invalidation of the entire statute were the Court to rule that the statute’s PCAOB provisions are
unconstitutional. Under the long-recognized judicially created severability doctrine (the
“Severability Doctrine”), that would be the result only if the Court determines that Congress
would not have enacted the remaining portions of SOX without the PCAOB provisions.
The application of the Severability Doctrine by the Court in the Free Enterprise Fund
case, however, would not necessarily mean that the remaining provisions of SOX would survive
if the PCAOB provisions fail. The Court might well find that Congress would not have enacted
the remaining provisions of SOX independently of the PCAOB provisions. It is true that SOX
includes numerous provisions that are designed to protect investors and that are not dependent on
the PCAOB, e.g., the provisions requiring the certification of financial statements by CEOs and
CFOs that no material misstatement exists (§ 302); the requirement of an assessment by
management on internal controls as well as a report on that assessment by the independent
401
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auditor (§ 404); requiring disclosure on a financial expert on the audit committee (§ 407); and the
protection of whistleblowers (§ 806). Many of the requirements outside of the PCAOB
provisions in SOX are independent of the PCAOB and are enforceable by the SEC and,
moreover, would remain fully functional and operational without the PCAOB. As the CAQ
noted in the amicus brief that it filed in this case:
[SOX] has many provisions focused on enhancing the accuracy and reliability of
financial statements, including a requirement for management certifications
relating to financial statements, new disclosures and audit procedures related to
internal controls, and an enhanced role for audit committees.402
The CAQ concedes, however, that “[t]he centerpiece of the legislation is the creation of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board” and that the passage of SOX “created
a new paradigm for audit regulation, which relies heavily on the newly created
PCAOB.”403
On the other hand, the invalidation of SOX—which has been viewed by the
public as a major piece of investor protection legislation—in its entirety could have a
potentially significant detrimental effect on investor confidence and on enforcement of
the federal securities laws, and the Court conceivably could consider that potential impact
in its assessment of whether Congress would have enacted SOX as an investor-protection
measure even without the PCAOB provisions.
VI.

Implications of the Court’s Decision
The Court’s decision in the Free Enterprise Fund case will result in one of two scenarios.

In the first, the constitutionality of the PCAOB is upheld. In the second, the Court would deem
the PCAOB to be unconstitutional. Several public policy questions and governance implications
arise from the second scenario.
402
403
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A.

Scenario 1: Constitutionality of PCAOB Upheld
Should the Court affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the constitutionality of the

PCAOB will have been validated. The PCAOB, having passed constitutional muster, would
continue as the regulatory authority for auditors. As the CAQ observed in its amicus brief:
. . . [T]he establishment of the PCAOB has generally been seen by auditors as a
net positive for the profession, capital markets, and investors. Were the Court to
strike down the PCAOB, all of these benefits—expert, focused regulation;
improved audit quality through a system of inspections emphasizing remediation;
and stability of the regulatory regime—would be cast aside.404
Furthermore, the negative effects that the Free Enterprise Fund case has had on the ongoing ability of the organization to recruit Board members will be remediated.405 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to improve investor confidence and the public
responsibility of independent auditors that Chief Justice Burger described in U.S. v.
Arthur Young & Co., and both objectives would appear to continue to be served by a
decision affirming the constitutionality of the PCAOB.
B.

Scenario 2: PCAOB Declared Unconstitutional
In the second scenario, the Court would declare the PCAOB unconstitutional. Such a

decision, simply put, would drastically alter the existing regulatory framework established by
SOX for the audit profession. The PCAOB is responsible for both standard-setting and
enforcement, so the accounting profession would lose both of these important functions should
the Court strike down the PCAOB. Beyond this very basic change, overturning the Court of
Appeals decision would have a number of other significant implications.
First, there would be vast uncertainty within the business community and accounting
profession if the PCAOB were struck down. Foremost, what would happen to the auditing
404
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standards-setting and enforcement role that the PCAOB performed? Cindy Fornelli, Executive
Director of the Center for Audit Quality, recently opined that the SEC could formally adopt the
standards promulgated by the PCAOB, which would provide consistency for auditors and public
companies, but the SEC is not set up to create such standards and is neither equipped nor
interested in doing so.406 Although the SEC has approved the existing PCAOB auditing
standards and could adopt these standards as their own should the PCAOB be declared
unconstitutional, the SEC would likely delegate the responsibility for promulgating future
auditing standards, such as the Commission has with accounting standards, to FASB. The
problem with such an approach, however, is that the delegation to FASB contradicts the original
purpose of the PCAOB—independence from the profession.
Second, the elimination of the PCAOB would mean that there would be no rigorous
inspection process for audit firms. The SEC itself does not likely have the resources to assume
the responsibility for inspecting audit firms, and, has been seen, the peer reviews used by the
profession before the creation of the PCAOB simply did not work.
Finally, the SEC historically has been under-staffed and over-worked, so, eliminating the
PCAOB would not be in the long-term best interests of investors.
Is a “quick fix” available to make the PCAOB constitutional? Counsel for the petitioners
suggests that, no, there is not, given the numerous flaws of the statute.407 Judge Kavanaugh, in
his dissent in the Court of Appeals decision, however, provides two alternatives to remedy the
problems of the PCAOB provisions of SOX:
. . . Congress could easily fix the constitutional flaws by, for example, making
PCAOB members subject to Presidential appointment with the advice and consent
of the Senate and therefore removable by the President. Alternatively, Congress
could fix the problem by making the PCAOB a truly subordinate part of the SEC
406
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– for example, by giving the SEC express authority to direct and supervise all
Board actions and to fire Board members at will. In such a structure, the Board
would not differ from any other inferior officers in the SEC. In the meantime, in
my judgment, the Board’s structure violates the Constitution of the United
States.408
Although Judge Kavanaugh’s first alternative might well raise issues concerning the
salary and revenue-raising fee structure of the PCAOB, making PCAOB members
principal officers would not conflict with the objective of Congress in making the
PCAOB an independent entity. The purpose of the PCAOB provisions of SOX was to
replace self-regulation of the profession with a “‘strong independent accounting oversight
board’—‘independent,’ that is, from the accounting profession,”409 not independent from
the President, as had been intent of the independent-counsel statute in Morrison.
In the second alternative, while perhaps increasing the SEC’s removal power by
authorizing the Commission to remove Board members at will, rather than only for cause,
the proposed change would not restore any Presidential control over the PCAOB, which
is the Free Enterprise Fund petitioners’ primary objection.
Even if Congress could perform “statutory surgery”410 to remedy any
constitutional problems with the PCAOB appointment provisions, such a revision of SOX
might not just be a simple “quick fix.” Indeed, some commentators believe that if
Congress were to revisit SOX, the amendments would not be limited to the PCAOB
provisions.411 For instance, the SEC has granted smaller companies temporary
exemptions from the Section 404 requirements through June 15, 2010, but has announced
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that “there will be no further Commission extension.”412 Many have already called for
this temporary exemption to be made permanent, and the House Financial Services
Committee has approved a measure to amend SOX accordingly in the interests of smaller
public companies.413
If SOX were to be revisited along the lines suggested by Kavanaugh, there is, of
course, no assurance that Congress would actually pass such a revised bill. The political
and social environment has changed since the Enron/WorldCom era during which the bill
first passed. As time has passed, the Enron affair is no longer a pressing issue, though
reference is often made to the scandal. Moreover, the current financial crisis has resulted
in an onslaught of new issues. Bank failures and the Madoff scandal have led the both
the public and legislators again to call for reform. For instance, Congress, led by Senate
Banking Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT), is working on a broad-sweeping financial
reform bill.414 It should be noted that some commentators believe that legislation, like
SOX, is not the most efficient means of effecting changes in corporate governance.415
As has been discussed, the issue of severability presents a considerable question: Should
the Court declare the PCAOB unconstitutional, does the remainder of SOX fall with it? SOX
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was passed to protect investors and restore confidence in the markets. Invalidating a significant
piece of securities legislation like SOX, which was specifically designed by Congress to protect
investors in response to pressure from the investing public, thus could have a detrimental effect
on investor confidence and the enforcement of federal securities laws, especially given the worry
over the current financial crisis. Independent auditors provide a check, if you will, in the overall
balance of the business community, and SOX was intended to facilitate and balance that check.
Even if SOX remains, though without the PCAOB, a successful constitutional challenge
to the statute’s PCAOB provisions is very likely to encourage additional challenges—inside and
outside the courts—to SOX. Indeed, Congress is already attempting to amend SOX, and further
legislative proposals to alter the statute in ways that are inconsistent with the original purpose of
SOX might well be forthcoming. For instance, the PCAOB has time and again been compared to
the stock exchanges and self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) currently reporting to the
SEC.416 The PCAOB contends that the oversight of the SROs is similar to the SEC oversight of
the PCAOB. The web of SROs within the securities industry, like the National Association of
Securities Dealers or New York Stock Exchange, would potentially become a target of
subsequent constitutional challenges.
VII.

Conclusion
The PCAOB is an important organization—for good or bad, the Board affects auditors,

investors, public companies, and arguably the general public. The Free Enterprise Fund case is
a serious challenge to what is, in reality, the cornerstone of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is
itself a significant piece of reform legislation designed to protect the investing public. The
implications of the case could be far-reaching. Indeed, the auditing profession, the business
community, constitutional law, independent agencies, the government, and the public interest
416
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each has an important stake in the Court’s decision in the case, and each is very likely to be
affected by that decision. The legal principles at play in the Free Enterprise Fund case are open
to interpretation, and the choices that the Court makes in rendering its decision will provide the
legal framework for investor-protection measures enacted by Congress in the foreseeable future.

103
APPENDIX A–TIMELINE OF SEC CHAIRMEN**
President
Roosevelt

Chairman

Term

Joseph P. Kennedy (D)
James M. Landis (D)
William O. Douglas (D)
Jerome N. Frank (D)
Edward C. Eicher (D)
Ganson Purcell (D)
James J. Caffrey (D)

7/2/34 - 9/23/35
9/23/35 - 9/15/37
9/21/37 - 4/16/39
5/18/39 - 4/9/41
4/9/41 - 1/20/42
1/20/42 - 6/30/46
7/23/46 - 12/31/47

Edmond M. Hanrahan (D)
Harry A. McDonald (R)
Donald C. Cook (D)

5/18/48 - 11/3/49
11/4/49 - 2/25/52
2/26/52 - 6/17/53

Ralph H. Demmler (R)
J. Sinclair Armstrong (R)
Edward N. Gadsby (R)

6/17/53 - 5/25/55
5/25/55 - 6/27/57
8/20/57 - 3/26/61

William L. Cary (D)
Manuel F. Cohen (D)

3/27/61 - 8/20/64
8/20/64 - 2/22/69

Truman

Eisenhower

Kennedy
Johnson
---

Nixon
Hamer H. Budge (R)
William J. Casey (R)
G. Bradford Cook (R)
Ray Garrett, Jr. (R)

2/22/69 - 1/2/71
4/14/71 - 2/2/73
3/3/73 - 5/16/73
8/6/73 - 10/28/75

Roderick M. Hills (R)

10/28/75 - 4/10/77

Harold M. Williams (D)

4/18/77 - 3/1/81

John Shad (R)
David S. Ruder (R)

5/6/81 - 6/18/87
8/7/87 - 9/30/89

Richard C. Breeden (R)

10/11/89 - 5/7/93

Arthur Levitt (D)

7/27/93 - 2/9/01

Harvey L. Pitt (R)
William H. Donaldson (R)
Christopher Cox (R)

8/3/01 - 2/17/03
2/18/03 - 6/30/05
8/03/05 - 1/20/09

Mary L. Schapiro (I)

1/27/00 – present

Ford
Carter
Reagan
G.H.W. Bush
Clinton
G.W. Bush

Obama
**Adapted from http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm
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